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Fakulteta za računalnǐstvo in informatiko
Andraž Krašovec
Ocena informativnosti senzorjev za
identifikacijo uporabnikov v okolju
IoT
MAGISTRSKO DELO
MAGISTRSKI PROGRAM DRUGE STOPNJE
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Abstract
Title: Assessing the Informativeness of Sensed Data for User Identification
in IoT
The shortcomings of the traditional password-based authentication mech-
anism are becoming increasingly apparent as we transition from “one user
– one device” to a richer “multiple users – multiple devices” computing
paradigm. The currently dominant research direction focuses on on-device
biometrics, which require sensitive information, such as images of a user’s
face, to be constantly streamed from a single recording source, often the
device on which a user is getting authenticated. Instead, in this work we
explore the possibilities offered by heterogeneous devices that opportunisti-
cally collect non-sensitive data in smart environments. We construct an IoT
testbed in which we gather data pertaining to a person’s movement in space,
interaction with certain physical objects, PC terminal usage, and keyboard
typing, and construct machine learning models capturing the person’s be-
haviour traits. We commence our examination with models constructed from
data sensed during a previously-completed task run and with such models
we achieve up to 68% user identification accuracy (c.f. 7% baseline) among
up to 20 individuals. Taking into account the limits of behaviour persis-
tence we then revise our approach to continuously refine the model with the
most recently sampled sensor data. This method allows us to achieve 99.3%
user verification accuracy and successfully prevent a session takeover attack
within 12 seconds with less than 1% of false attack detection.
Keywords
Internet of Things, Continuous Authentication, Machine Learning
Povzetek
Naslov: Ocena informativnosti senzorjev za identifikacijo uporabnikov v
okolju IoT
Pomanjkljivost avtentikacijskih mehanizmov z uporabo gesel postajajo
vse bolj očitne, sploh v prehodu s klasične metode uporabe naprav “en upo-
rabnik – ena naprava”, v bogateǰso “več uporabnikov – več naprav”. Tre-
nutno prevladujoče raziskovalno področje, ki se ukvarja z odpravo zastarelih
konceptov avtentikacije, temelji na biometričnih podatkih. Takšna avten-
tikacija zahteva uporabo občutljivih podatkov, kot naprimer slike uporab-
nikovega obraza, ki se nenehno zajemajo in shranjujejo na napravi sami.
Nasprotno v našem delu razǐsčemo možnosti, ki jih ponuja avtentikacija z
množico naprav, ki zajemajo zgolj neobčutljive podatke v pametnem okolju.
S tem namenom zasnujemo in postavimo testno okolje, ki temelji na tehno-
logijah interneta stvari (IoT) in zbira najrazličneǰse vedenjske vzorce upo-
rabnika, na primer rokovanje z mǐsko in tipkovnico, uporaba računalnǐskih
virov in vzorci premikanja po prostoru. Nato na podlagi zbranih podatkov
s pomočjo strojnega učenja te vzorce izluščimo in pridobljeno znanje upora-
bimo za prepoznavanje in nenehno avtentikacijo uporabnikov. Pridobljeno
znanje zatem uporabimo za različne naloge. V tem delu se osredotočimo na
prepoznavo uporabnikov in nato le-to nadgradimo s sistemom nenehne av-
tentikacije, ki vsako sekundo preveri, ali je v prostoru še vedno ista oseba kot
je bila pred tem. Za izgradnjo modelov prepoznave uporabnikov uporabimo
vnaprej pridobljene podatke, nakar s pomočjo teh modelov poiskusimo napo-
vedati kateri uporabnik je trenutno prisoten v prostoru. Pri takšni napovedi
dosežemo točnost 68% pri 7% točnosti večinskega klasifikatorja. Na podlagi
pridobljenih izkušenj naposled zasnujemo še sistem nenehne avtentikacije, ki
uporabi podatke zadnjih n sekund in napove ali se je oseba, prisotna v pro-
storu, zamenjala. Z uporabo tega pristopa ujamemo 99,3% vseh izvedenih
napadov, s povprečnim zamikom dvanajstih sekund in z manj kot 1% lažnih
zaznav napada.
Ključne besede
Internet stvari, Nenehna avtentikacija, Strojno učenje
Razširjeni povzetek
Z vzponom umetne inteligence in posledičnim porastom zbiranja podatkov
na vsakem koraku postajata varnost zasebnih podatkov in nadzor dostopa
vedno pomembneǰsi disciplini. Avtentikacija je od nekdaj prevladujoč način
nadzora dostopa, kljub temu pa klasična avtentikacija po večini še vedno
temelji na uporabi gesel, ki predstavljajo tako varnostne kot tudi uporabnǐske
pomanjkljivosti in grožnje [1, 2].
Prehod iz nekaj kar uporabnik pozna v nekaj kar uporabnik je, po navadi s
podporo biometrije, so vse človeške lastnosti s katerimi lahko uporabnika raz-
bremenimo pomnjenja najrazličneǰsih gesel. Na primer prstni odtisi, obraz,
šarenica, glas ali način hoje. Kljub očitnim prednostim, se te tehnike še vedno
zanašajo na avtentikacijo zgolj na začetku uporabe, potem pa predpostavijo,
da se uporabnik ne menja, dokler eksplicitno ne naznani, da je z uporabo
končal in se de-avtenticira. Prav tako je predpogoj za delovanje takšnih sis-
temov zbiranje osebnih biometričnih podatkov, ki so nato po pravilu last
proizvajalca naprav, kar seveda ni po godu marsikateremu uporabniku [3].
Te izzive lahko rešimo z uporabo vedenjske biometrije, ki sestavi celo-
sten profil posameznika z analizo osebno neobčutljivih podatkov na podlagi
uporabe različnih senzorjev, postavljenih v določeno okolje [4]. Še več, glede
na neivazivno naravo pristopa, je prehod z enkratne na nenehno avtentika-
cijo trivialen. Prav tako naj bi do leta 2025 število naprav interneta stvari
(IoT) preseglo 75 milijard [5], kar bo zneslo skoraj deset naprav na vsakega
zemljana. Zategadelj te naprave predstavljajo velik vir podatkov na podlagi
katerih bi lahko temeljili sistemi nenehne avtentikacije prihodnosti.
i
ii
V tem delu se vzpenmo nad enkratno avtentikacijo na podlagi posamezne
naprave, značilnosti ali gesla in razvijemo delujoč sistem nenehne avtentika-
cije v IoT okolju. V ta namen razvijemo eksperimentalno okolje na Fakulteti
za računalnǐstvo in informatiko, Univerze v Ljubljani, sestavljeno iz množice
senzorjev (npr. pospeškometer, žiroskop, senzor sile, infrardeči senzor) in
računalnǐske infrastrukture (osebni računalnik, WiFi omrežje, podatkovni in
avtentikacijski strežnik), ki spominja na sodobno opremljeno pisarno. Nato
v okolju zberemo podatke enaindavjestih uporabnikov, ki opravljajo predpri-
pravljene naloge. Na podlagi podatkov ocenimo informativnost posameznih
senzorjev in značilk, izračunanih iz zajetih podatkov. Z uporabo naključnih
gozdov, dosežemo do 68% točnost prepoznave uporabnikov pri 7% točnosti
večinskega klasifikatorja. Ko iz pridobljenega znanja zasnujemo še sistem
nenehne avtentikacije, je le-ta sposoben zaznave več kot 99% primerov napa-
dov.
Glavni prispevki našega dela so:
1. Prepoznava najbolj informativnih senzorjev in značilk pri IoT podprti
avtentikaciji v pisarnǐskem okolju,
2. razvoj avtentikacijskega mehanizma, ki temelji na uporabi zgolj osebno
neobčutljivih podatkov,
3. dognanje omejene časovne trajnosti informativnosti podatkov in stre-
mljenje k uporabi nepretrgoma osvežujočih se modelov pri nenehni av-
tentikaciji,
4. zasnova sistema nenehne avtentikacije, ki spremlja že avtenticiranega
uporabnika in ga pravilno prepozna v 99,3% primerov,
5. uporabiti lastnost intervala zaupanja klasifikatorja za razvoj algoritma,
ki zazna spremembo uporabnika (napad) v dvanajstih sekundah in
lažno zazna napad v manj kot 1% primerih,
6. objava zbranih podatkov, uporabljenih v tem delu, in pripadajoče pro-
gramske kode za njihovo obdelavo in izgradnjo ter uporabo modelov
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strojnega učenja.
Naša raziskava je na tej točki izvedena v skrbno zasnovanem pisarnǐskem
okolju, kljub temu verjamemo, da bodo naša dognanja, glede na izjemen
porast IoT naprav, uporabna v najrazličneǰsih okoljih – od bolnǐsnic, preko
podjetji, do tovarn. Še več, kljub temu, da se v tem delu osredotočimo
na avtentikacijo, se lahko modeliranje vedenjskih vzorcev uporabnikov še na
marsikaterem področju, na primer za personalizacijo storitev. Verjamemo,
da je modeliranje vedenjskih vzorcev na podlagi najrazličneǰsih senzorjev
naslednji korak, ki bo pripomogel k dejanski pameti v okoljih interneta stvari.
I Sorodna dela
Pri večini vsakodnevne avtentikacije še vedno uporabljamo gesla. Kljub
mnogo vloženega truda po izbolǰsanju varnosti gesel [6, 7] in ob istem času
zmanǰsanju motenj uporabnika [7, 8], se še vedno, znova in znova, ponavlja
ključni element, ki ni kos nalogi avtentikacije – uporabnik. Zato obstajajo
mnogi pristopi avtentikacije, ki izključijo uporabnika kot aktivno kompo-
nento procesa avtentikacije. Namesto, da mora uporabnik vnašati gesla,
sistem spremlja njegove značilnosti, navade in vedenjske vzorce. Poleg tega
avtentikacija pogosto poteka skozi celotno dolžino uporabe sistema, namesto
zgolj preverbe pred avtorizacijo uporabnika, kar seveda zmanǰsa možnosti
zlorabe dostopa do sistema. Področje, ki se ukvarja z nenehnim preverja-
njem identitete uporabnika, se imenuje nenehna avtentikacija (continuous
authentication – CA). Poznamo mnogo pristopov k avtentikaciji in nenehni
avtentikaciji brez potrebe po akciji uporabnika. Nekaj pomembneǰsih bomo
predstavili v naslednjih odstavkih, predstavili njihove prednosti in pomanj-
kljivosti ter jih povezali z našim delom.
Dinamika tipkanja (keystroke dynamics) je skupek tehnik, ki se ukvarja
z analizo uporabe tipkovnice, natančneje s časovnimi razmiki med pritiskom
zaporedja tipk in časa pritiska posamezne tipke [9, 10, 11]. Še več, Mondal
et al. predstavijo sistem, ki se poleg uporabe tipkovnice, osredotoči tudi
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na vzorce uporabe mǐske [12]. Dinamika tipkanja predstavlja enega naj-
uspešneǰsih načinov nenehne avtentikacije, saj lahko doseže natančnost do
skoraj 100%, vendar na račun zbiranja podatkov vnosa s tipkovnice uporab-
nika, kar lahko seveda pripelje do razkritja občutljivih informacij. Naš sistem
zamenja spremljanje vsake pritisnjene tipke s pospeškometrom in žiroskopom
ter tako doseže podoben efekt, vendar brez zajemanja vsebine tipkanja upo-
rabnika.
Naslednji pristop, ki je doživel velik razcvet v zadnjih letih, je prepo-
znavanje obrazov in omogoča tako avtentikacijo kot nenehno avtentikacijo
ter na nekaterih telefonih in računalnikih že zamenjuje klasično avtentika-
cijo z gesli. Zaznava obrazov, ki je predpogoj za prepoznavo, dosega skoraj
popolne rezultate [13] in je omogočila marsikatero tehniko prepoznavanja
obrazov [14, 15, 16, 17]. Kljub vsemu še vedno obstajajo pomanjkljivosti, ki
ovirajo uspešnost tovrstnih algoritmov. Na primer slaba osvetlitev, razda-
lja in kot med kamero in obrazom ter trenutno najbolj razširjen problem –
maske in druga pokrivala, ki zakrivajo obraz, so pogosto še vedno trn v peti
tehnikam prepoznave obraza. Zaradi težnje po uporabi pristopov, ki zaje-
majo zgolj osebno neobčutljive podatke, prepoznavanja obraza nismo vključil
v naš sistem, predvsem zaradi narave pristopa, ki zajema in shranjuje slike
uporabnikovega obraza.
Izkorǐsčujoč dejstvo, da vsak posameznik rokuje z računalnikom na malo
drugačen način, sledeči pristopi uporabijo različne metrike porabe računalnǐskih
virov. Najsibodi obremenjenost procesorja, spomina in omrežja [18], vzor-
cev brskanja po spletu [19], ali spremljanje ustvarjanja procesov, spremembe
ključev registra in sistema datotek [20], vse omenjene tehnike prepoznavajo
posamezne uporabnike glede na njihovo interakcijo z računalnikom. Podobno
kot zgoraj opisani tehniki, tudi tu marsikdaj naletimo na zajem osebnih po-
datkov. Zato smo se odločili, da v naš sistem vključimo zgolj podatke of
porabi procesorja, spomina in omrežja.
Vseprisotnost sodobnih pametnih telefonov in njihova naphanost z množico
senzorjev so trenutno gonilna sila razvoja nenehne avtentikacije [21]. Naše
v
delo se sicer osredotoča na pametno pisarnǐsko okolje in na tej točki pa-
metnih telefonov še ne vključuje, vendar zanje obstajajo številni pristopi,
ki so bodisi povzeti s pristopov na osebnih računalnikih bodisi popolnoma
novi, saj v majhni napravi ponujajo zmožnost zaznavanja najrazličneǰsih
podatkov. Dinamika tipkanja, ki se je na mobilne telefone preselila z oseb-
nih računalnikov [22] in njej sorodna dinamika dotikanja, ki je namensko
zaživela z razcvetom pametnih telefonov, kjer se za analizo vzorcev vnosa
besedila uporabljajo pospeškometer, žiroskop in magnetometer [23, 24, 25],
je ustreznica našega pristopa uporabe pospeškometra in žiroskopa na tipkov-
nici. Še več, različni pristopi se osredotočajo tudi na profiliranje uporabni-
kov [26, 27, 28, 29], ali pa prepoznavanje načina hoje [30, 31].
Našemu pristopu najbolj sorodni so drugi večmodalni pristopi. Ti združujejo
uporabo različnih naprav, senzorjev in tehnik nenehne avtentikacije za dose-
ganje čimvǐsje natančnosti in posledično povǐsane varnosti sistema, po prin-
cipu “več glav več ve”. To področje je najbolj raznoliko izmed predstavlje-
nih, saj vsebuje mnoge že omenjene in številne druge tehnike avtentikacije
in nenehne avtentikacije. Na primer prikladno poimenovan članek “The Ho-
use That Knows You: User Authentication Based on IoT Data” [32], ki se
osredotoča na prepoznavo uporabnikov glede na množico pametnih (IoT) na-
prav v domačem okolju in spremlja njihovo internetno komunikacijo ter tako
doseže 86% in 97% natančnost prepoznave uporabnikov. Še en primer je
članek Deutschmann et al., ki združuje dinamiko tipkanja in uporabe mǐske
s profilom uporabe aplikacij ter porabe procesorja in spomina [33]. Poleg
tega obstajajo tudi pristopi, ki združujejo profiliranje hoje posameznika s
signali EEG [34], ali s prepoznavo obraza [35]. Kljub doseganju zavidljivih
rezultatov, seveda obstajajo lastnosti, ki jih je moč izbolǰsati. Bodisi je nji-
hov obseg omejen na zgolj en tip okolja – družinska hǐsa z le nekaj člani
bodisi se še vedno pogovarjamo o zajemu občutlijivih podatkov. Verjamemo,
da lahko sistem podoben takšenmu kot ga predstavimo v tem delu, služi v
mnogih različnih okoljih, brez zajemanja občutljivih podatkov.
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II Testno IoT okolje
Kljub različnim pristopom, ki naj bi nadomestili gesla, so ta še vedno vsepri-
sotna in dnevno grenijo življenje marsikomu. Zato v tem delu zasnujemo in
postavimo testno IoT okolje, z namenom zbiranja vedenjskih podatkov skozi
različne eksperimente. Testno okolje je postavljeno v laboratoriju FRIžider,
na Fakulteti za računalnǐstvo in informatiko Univerze v Ljubljani in simulira
običajno sodobno pisarno. V temu razdelku predstavimo strojno in pro-
gramsko opremo, ki sestavlja naš sistem. Cilj je seveda zagotoviti nemoteno
zbiranje podatkov in zmožnost ponovne uporabe sistema v prihodnjih pro-
jektih.
Testno okolje je sestavljeno iz treh večjih sklopov:
• Strežnika,
• omrežja ter
• mikrokrmilnikov in senzorjev.
Vsakega izmed sklopov bomo predstavili v naslednjih podrazdelkih. Viso-
konivojska predstavitev arhitekture sistema je prikazana na sliki 3.1, slike
dejanskega okolja na sliki 3.2, postavitev posameznih senzorjev v prostoru
pa na sliki 3.3.
II.I Omrežje
Najpreprosteǰsi sklop uporabljenih tehnologij predstavlja omrežje. Zavoljo
kratkega postavitvenega časa in enostavnosti tehnologije, uporabljamo za
komunikacijo med krmilniki in strežnikom brezžično tehnologijo WiFi. V
okolju je nameščen usmerjevalnik, katerega edina naloga je zagotavljanje ne-
motenega pretoka podatkov med mikrokrmilniki in strežnikom. Edina izjema
uporabe so podatki, ki jih z eksperimentalnega računalnika prenese PC mo-
nitor, ki je zadolžen za zbiranje podatkov o porabi procesorja, spomina in
omrežja. Ker je ta računalnik povezan z žično ethernet povezavo, to upora-
bimo tudi za pošiljanje prej omenjenih podatkov.
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Na aplikacijskem nivoju smo izkoristili prednosti protokola MQTT1, saj
je namenjen ravno enostavneǰsim IoT omrežjem kot je naše. Ponuja preprost
način imenovanja naprav, kar nam omogoča enostavno prepoznavo posame-
znih naprav in senzorjev v omrežju.
II.II Strežnik
Strežnik je sestavljen iz sedmih ločenih, po meri napisanih komponent, ki
skupaj zagotavljajo, da so sprejeti podatki obdelani in shranjeni v podat-
kovno bazo v dejanskem času. Z izjemo podatkovne baze vse procese nadzira
Supervisor2. Komponente strežnika so naslednje:
1. Podatkovna baza. Za shranjevanje podatkov smo se odločili za upo-
rabo kombiniranega pristopa relacijske (PostgreSQL3) podatkovne baze,
podprte z razširitvijo podatkovne baze časovnih vrst TimescaleDB4. To
nam omogoča izkoristek prednosti obeh v eni rešitvi – senzorske po-
datke zapǐsemo v bazo časvnih vrst, medtem ko vse ostale podatke o
napravah, senzorjih, uporabnikih in eksperimentih zapǐsemo v klasično,
relacijsko podatkovno bazo.
2. Data Worker je komponenta sistema, ki skrbi za obdelavo in shra-
njevanje prejetih podatkov s senzorjev. Je časovno najbolj kritična
komponenta, saj v primeru večjih zamikov pri shranjevanju podatkov
onemogoči delovanje ostalih sistemov, ki se zanašajo na sveže podatke.
3. Upravljalci. V našem sistemu smo implementirali štiri različne upra-
vljalce, kjer prvi poskrbi za komunikacijo preko MQTT protokola, ostali
trije pa na podlagi prvega skrbijo za določene funkcije sistema. Prvi
izmed the treh – Data Manager, je zadolžen za sprejemanje senzor-






sprazni vsako sekunko in vsebina se pošlje Data Workerju v obdelavo.
Naslednji je Device Manager, ki skrbi za dvosmerno komunikacijo
z mikrokrmilniki. Trenutno je namenjen “predstavitvi” posameznih
krmilnikov, do katere pride vsakič, ko ga vklopimo. Takrat krmilnik
pošlje svojo identifikacijsko številko, ime in seznam senzorjev. Device
Manager nato te podatke vnese ali posodobi v podatkovni bazi. Tretji
in s tem zadnji, je Seance Manager. Ta je zadolžen za sprejemanje
signalov, ki jih pošilja čitalec RFID kartic, na podlagi katerih se začne
in konča vsaka seansa posameznega eksperimenta.
4. Avtentikator je zadnja, po meri napisana komponenta strežnika. Le-
to smo implementirali kot zadnje dejanje našega dela, saj se zanaša
na izsledke in rezulate, pridobljene z opravljenimi raziskavami in kot
nakaže že ime, skrbi za nenehno avtentikacijo uporabnika znotraj se-
anse.
II.III Mikrokrmilniki in senzorji
Zagotovo najkompleksnešji sklop našega sistema je množica mikrokrmilnikov
in senzorjev, ki zajemajo podatke iz okolja. Zaradi razširjenosti in preprosto-
sti uporabe smo vso strojno-programsko opremo napisali z uporabo Arduino
platforme5, saj omogoča hiter razvoj relativno nekompleksnih programov. V
tem podrazdelku predstavimo uporabljen mikrokrmilnik ter senzorje.
Ker naš sistem temelji na uporabi tehnologije WiFi za komunikacijo med
napravami in strežnikom, smo se odločili za uporabo na ESP 8266 temelječih
mikrokrmilnikih Node MCU, saj imajo že vgrajen vmesnik za povezovanje
v WiFi omrežja poleg tega pa ponuja zadostno število nožic za priklop vseh
želenih senzorjev. Napajanje mikrokrmilnikov je izvedeno preko stenskih
vtičnic s pomočjo standardnih telefonskih polnilcev (5V-1A). Ob ustreznem
zmanǰsanju frekvence vzorčenja, bi lahko krmilnike napajali tudi z baterijami.
Za zajemanje podatkov, na katerih kasneje temeljijo vedenski vzorci, smo
5https://www.arduino.cc/
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uporabili najrazličneǰse senzorje. Končni izbor dejanskih senzorjev temelji na
predhodnih testih in trenutnih industrijskih trendih. V spodnjih odstavkih
na kratko predstavimo vsakega izmed senzorjev.
Senzorji sile (df9-40), ki smo jih uporabili v vsakem vogalu na pritisk
občutljive plošče, so elementi katerih električna upornost se spremeni na pod-
lagi količine sile, ki se izvaja nad senzorjem. Na pritisk občutljiva plošča je
prikazana na sliki 3.2 levo zgoraj. Interval vrednosti, ki jih shranimo v po-
datkovno bazo je med vključno 0 in 1023, saj je analogno-digitalni pretvornik
(ADC) našega mikrokrmilnika 10-biten.
Pasivni infrardeči senzorji (hc-sr501) so namenjeni zaznavanju gibanja. V
našem okolju smo namestili šest takšnih senzorjev v namen prepoznave vzor-
cev premikanja uporabnikov. Začetna testiranja so pokazala, da so senzorji
precej občutljivi in z nekaj prilagoditvami in izgradnjo omejevalnikov snopa
posameznega senzorja dosežemo želeno delovanje. Uporabili smo digitalno
nožico senzorja, ki vrne zgolj logični vrednosti 0 in 1, kar je enakovredno
odstonosti, oziroma prisotnosti gibanja.
Hallovi senzorji (ky-035), zaznavajo jakost elemtromagnetnega polja na
podlagi Hallovega pojava. V zadnji izmed zastavljenih nalog, predstavljeni v
razdelku III morajo sodelujoči slediti navodilom, ki so razvrščena v zaporedju
škatel. Vsaka izmed njih je opremeljena s Hallovim senzorjem in magnetom,
kar nam omogoča zaznavanje odprtja in zaprtja vsake izmed škatel. Podobno
kot infrardeči senzorji tudi Hallovi senzorji pošiljajo zgolj logične vrednosti
0 in 1.
Kombinacija pospeškometra in žiroskopa v šestosnem senzorju (mpu-
6050), je nameščena na tipkovnico z razlogom zaznave tipkalnih navad upo-
rabnika. Posledično je krmilnik, na katerega je priključen ta senzor, na
strežnik pošilja šest različnih podatkov – pospešek in kotno hitrost x, y in z
osi.
Za zajem podatkov porabe procesorja, spomina in omrežja, uporabimo
po meri napisano programsko kodo v programskem jeziku Python6, ki enkrat
6https://www.python.org/
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vsako sekundo odčita odstotkovne vrednosti porabe prej zapisanih računalnǐskih
virov. Rešitev je bila za naše potrebe zadovoljiva, vendar bi v primeru po-
trebe po vǐsji frekvenci vzorčenja raje uporabili kakšen nižjenivojski pristop.
Zadnji senzor, ki ne služi zajemu podatkov, pač pa signalizaciji pričetka
in konca vsakega eksperimenta, je čitalec RFID kartic (rc522). Prednost
takšnega pristopa, namesto, ročnega zagona vsakega eksperimenta je v večji
natančnosti in možnosti spremljanja vedenjskih vzorcev točno od trenutka
vstopa uporabnika v prostor. Poleg tega nam uporaba identifikacijskih kartic
omogoča razlikovanje med uporabniki brez dodatnih naporov.
III Zajem in obdelava podatkov
Z definiranim in postavljenim okoljem je naša naslednja naloga zajem po-
datkov in njihova obdelava ter priprava za uporabo z algoritmi strojnega
učenja. V ta namen vnaprej pripravimo tri različne naloge in nato povabiom
prostovoljce, da vsako izmed nalog opravijo dvakrat. Eksperiment je v ce-
loti opravilo 21 udeležencev, starih med 23 in 58 let, od tega 9 žensk in 12
moških, 12 študentov različnih fakultet Univerze v Ljubljani in 9 zaposlenih.
Naloge so naslednje:
1. Prva naloga od uporabnika zahteva, da napǐse sporočilo elektronske
pošte s predpripravljenim besedilom in ga pošlje na vnaprej določen
elektronski naslov. Besedili med prvo in drugo izvedbo naloge sta se
razlikovali, saj smo pri predhodnih testih odkrili, da lahko udeleženci
pri drugi ponovitvi zgolj prekopirajo besedilo s sporočila prve ponovi-
tve. Glavni namen te naloge je vzpodbuditi pospeškometer, žiroskop
in senzorje sile, saj udeleženci večino časa pri tej nalogi prepisujejo
besedilo.
2. Navodila druge naloge so namensko napisana bolj splošno, v pričakovanju
vzpodbuditve različnih vedenjskih vzorcev udeležencev. Ti morajo naj-
prej preveriti vremensko napoved določenega kraja ali države, nato pa
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na podlagi te napovedi predlagati obisk treh turističnih znamenitosti in
te predloge poslati preko elektronske pošte. Izbira kraja je prepuščena
udeležencem, vendar se mora med prvim in drugim opravljanjem na-
loge razlikovati. Senzor, ki ga pri teh nalogi želimo najbolj vzpodbuditi
je PC monitor, saj so imeli udeleženci proste roke pri izbiri programov,
orodji in spletnih strani, ki jih uporabijo za opravljanje te naloge.
3. Tretja naloga je od vseh najbolj raznolika, saj poleg rokovanja z računalnikom
od uporabnika zahteva tudi gibanje po prostoru. Uporabnik mora na
začetku slediti navodilom skozi vrsto škatel, ki so skrite po prostoru in
nato na podlagi navodil v zadnji škatli pripraviti graf s podatki, ki jih
najde poleg navodil. Seveda mora graf na koncu poslati preko elektron-
ske pošte in preden zapusti sobo tudi ponastaviti eksperiment. V prisilo
po raznolikosti vedenjskih vzorcev, je na sredini sobe postavljena vrsta
miz, kar udeležence prisli v izbiro različnih poti za opravljanje naloge.
Zaradi dodatne mobilnosti te naloge, so, poleg vseh ostalih, tu najbolj
aktivni infrardeči in pa Hallovi senzorji.
Vsak poskus vsake naloge se prične s prihodom v testno okolje, kjer upo-
rabnik, ne glede na nalogo, najprej prisloni RFID kartico ob čitalec in tako
sproži začetek zajemanja podatkov. Naloge opravi v enamkem vrstnem redu
kot so navedene zgoraj, med izvedbami posameznih nalog ima vsakič kraǰsi
premor, kjer opǐse svoje izkušnje in morebitna opažanja v okolju. Sklop
treh nalog opravi dvakrat, ko ga opravi prvič, se ga takoj zatem loti še
drugič. Vsaka naloga se konča, ko uporabnik ponovno prisloni RFID kartico
ob čitalec in zapusti prostor. S tem se zajem podatkov prekine in strežnik
zabeleži zaključek naloge. Med izvajanjem nalog je v prostoru zgolj upo-
rabnik. Osnovna statistika opravljanja vsake izmed nalog je predstavljena v
tabeli 4.1.
Po končanem zajemu podatkov se lotimo obdelave le-teh. Najprej pre-
gledamo podatke in izločimo neustrezne uporabnike glede na nalogo. Nato
izračunamo kopico značilk časovne in frekvenčne domene in na koncu s
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pomočjo linearne diskriminatne analize opravimo preliminarno analizo in-
formativnosti izračunanih značilk.
Kljub vsem predhodnim testom in implementaciji različnih varoval, se
občasno dogodi, da udeleženci ne sledijo navodilom, oziroma pride do tehničnih
težav, ki jih zasledimo šele po izvedbi eksperimentov. Zato odstranimo po-
datke nekaterih uporabnikov pri posameznih nalogah. V kolikor je bila ena
izmed izvedb naloge (prva ali druga) pri posameznem uporabniku kompri-
mirana, odstranimo podatke obeh izvedb te naloge tega udeleženca. Tako
ostane 17, 20 in 18 udeležencev pri prvi, drugi in tretji nalogi.
Nato iz preostalih podatkov izračunamo časovne in frekvenčne značilke, ki
jih nato uporabimo kot vhod v različne algoritme strojnega učenja. V časovni
domeni izračunamo klasične statistične značilke, na primer povprešno vre-
dnost, standardni odklon, pogostost prehoda povprečne vrednosti in druge.
Te vrednosti izračunamo za vsak časovni interval določenega števila sekund.
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, kjer n predstavlja število vrednosti znotraj posameznega časovnega inter-
vala. Skupni signal izračunamo za pospeškometer, žiroskop in porabo proce-
sorja. To si lahko privoščimo na podlagi dejstva, da imajo posamezni signali
enako število vrednosti v posameznem časovnem intervalu.
Poleg tega iz podatkov pospeškometra, žiroskopa in senzorjev sile izračunamo
tudi značilke v frekvenčni domeni. Ti senzorji imajo frekvenco vzorčenja
približno 200 Hz, kar nam omogoča izračun frekvenčne moči med 0 Hz in
100 Hz. To storimo z uporabo Hitre Fourierjeve transformacije (FFT) čez
vsak časovni segment posebej in nato izračunamo značilke. Pred uporabo
FFT s pomočjo linearne interpolacije obdelamo vrednosti tako, da je časovni
interval med posameznimi meritvami točno 5ms. Nato izračunamo povprečno
moč signala vsakih 10 Hz. Tabela 5.1 povzame vse izračunane značilke in
povprečno količino zajetih podatkov na eksperiment.
Preden pričnemo z apliciranjem algoritmov strojnega učenja preverimo
še v kolikšni meri so naše značilke sploh uporabne. V ta namen apliciramo
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linearno diskriminantno analizo (LDA) [36] in prikažemo najpomembneǰsi
komponenti v dvodimenzonalnem prostoru. Kot lahko vidimo na sliki 5.1,
dokler uporabimo podatke z zgolj ene izvedbe eksperimenta (zgornja vrsta)
lahko jasno ločimo med uporabniki (točke iste barve). V kolikor vpeljemo
podatke obeh izvedb (spodnja vrsta), je ta razločitev precej manj jasna.
Na tej točki smo zadovoljni, da lahko tudi z dvodimenzinalno LDA razliku-
jemo med uporabniki, napredneǰsi algoritmi strojnega učenja pa so z bolj
naprednimi metodami sposobni prepoznati unikatneǰsi prostor vsakega upo-
rabnika, tudi čez več različnih izvedb eksperimentov. Kakorkoli, verjamemo,
da je spremenljivost uporabnikovega vedenja med izvedbami zadosten ra-
zlog, da pri razvoju sistema nenehne avtentikacije uporabimo pristop kjer je
model izračunan iz podatkov trenutne seje uporabnika, namesto iz prej pri-
dobljenih podatkov. Vseeno se v naslednjih razdelkih najprej osredotočimo
na statično metodo prepoznave uporabnika s pomočjo podatkov preǰsnjih sej
in šele nato na nenehno avtentikacijo, ki nepretrgoma posodablja svoj model
za prepoznavanje uporabnika.
IV Prepoznava uporabnikov
Prva metoda, ki jo razvijemo v tem delu, se nanaša na prepoznavo uporab-
nikov. To pomeni uporabo različnih algoritmov strojnega učenja na podlagi
podatkov iz predhodnih sej za klasifikacijo novih podatkov v enega izmed
razredov bazena uporabnikov. Nadaljujemo od koraka predhodne analize
z LDA, opisanega v preǰsnjem razdelku. Na podlagi tamkaǰsnjih ugotovi-
tev in v izogib prekomernega prileganja, podatke razdelimo po posameznih
nalogah in kot učno množico vzamemo podatke prvih izvedb vseh treh na-
log. Podobno vzamemo podatke drugih izvedb kot testno množico. Ker so
prve izvedbe v povprečju malo dalǰse, pridobimo razmerje 57%-43% količine
podatkov med učno in testno množico. Za pohitritev in standardizacijo pri-
stopa, sestavimo cevovod strojnega učenja (ML pipeline) in nato na podlagi
količine pravilno napovedanih uporavnikov ocenimo točnost algoritma. Pri-
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stop v tem razdelku lahko povzamemo takole:
• Prostor izračunanih značilk je sestavljen iz 229 različnih vrednosti, kar
želimo oklestiti z motivacijo, da uporabimo zgolj najbolj informativne
značilke. Zato uporabimo univariatno selekcijo značilk z uporabo med-
sebojne informacije [37]. Vsakič kot vhod v algoritem strojenga učenja
pošljemo deset najbolje ocenjenih značilk.
• Kjerkoli ni druagče določeno, uporabimo časovni interval osmih sekund
za agregacijo podatkov, saj ponuja dobro razmerje med točnostjo in
hitrostjo izračuna.
• Točnost prepoznave je seveda odvisna od števila zajetih uporabni-
kov [38]. Zato preverimo tudi odvisnost našega sistema glede na število
uporabnikov. Pri tej preverbi vedno izčrpamo vse možne kombinacije
uporabnikov in poročamo o povprečnem rezultatu.
Najprej bomo pogledali uspešnost različnih algoritmov strojnega učenja.
Osredotočimo se predvsem na lahko izračunljive algoritme, saj je naš končni
cilj generacija modelov v dejanskem času (kNN, LDA, Naive Bayesian) in
skupinske algoritme, saj so po navadi zelo uspešni pri prepoznavanju upo-
rabnikov (naključni gozd, ADAboost). Ustrezne parametre vsakega klasifi-
katorja smo našli s pomočjo naključnega iskanja. Rezultati točnosti posa-
meznih algoritmov in primerjava z večinskim klasifikatorjem je predstavljena
na sliki 6.1. Vidimo lahko, da skupinska algoritma odstopata po točnosti
napovedi. V povprečju naključni gozd dosega 3% vǐsjo točnost kot ADAbo-
ost, zato od tu naprej uporabljamo zgolj še naključni gozd. Po točnosti sledi
LDA, ki je v povprečju slabih 10% slabša od ADAboost-a. Naive Bayes in
kNN sta uspešneǰsa od večinskega klasifikatorja, vendar se ne moreta kosati
z uspešnostjo ostalih algoritmov.
Poleg izbire uporabljenega klasifikatorja, sta za končni algoritem nenehne
avtentikacije pomembna še dva parametra – število legitimnih uporabni-
kov sistema in časovni interval posameznega segmenta. Zato se z upo-
rabo naključnega gozdu osredotočimo še na omenjena parametra. Nastavimo
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N = {3, 7, 11, 15} število uporabnikov in S = {1s, 4s, 8s, 32s, 128s} časovne
intervale segmentov in za kartezični produkt parov izvedemo prepoznavanje
uporabnikov kot je opisano na začetku tega poglavja. Rezultati so prikazani
na sliki 6.2. Po pričakovanjih lahko opazimo zmanǰsanje točnosti z dvigom
števila uporabnikov, vendar se trend padanja z dviganjem števila uporab-
nikov upočasni kar nakazuje na potencial skalabilnosti pristopa, vendar bi
to morali potrditi z večjim vzorcem uporabnikov. Razlike med točnostmi
različnih časovnih intervalov segmentov so precej manǰse. Vseeno se za naj-
uspešneǰsega izkaže 32-sekundni interval, vendar bi v primeru uporabe tako
dolgega intervala pri algoritmu nenehne avtentikacije potrebovali več kot pol
minute za vsako potrditev identitete uporabnika. Glede na majhne razlike si
lahko privoščimo tudi manǰsi interval in do konca tega razdelka bomo upo-
rabljali 8-sekundni časovni interval.
Eden izmed zastavljenih ciljev našega dela je tudi prepoznava informativ-
nosti posameznih senzorjev in značilk. Za oceno prispevka informativnosti
uporabimo Information Gain (IG), saj je to pogosto uporabljena metrika
za izbiro značilk in ocene informativnosti [39, 40]. Ker so naloge zastavljene
tako, da spodbudijo različne senzorje izračunamo IG za vsako nalogo posebej
in prikažemo zgolj značilke, ki so presegle 1% skupne entropije vseh značilk.
Rezultati so prikazani na sliki 6.3. Med značilkami prevladuje povprečna
vrednost, saj se v rezultatih pojavi kar šestindvajsetkrat od tridesetih prika-
zanih vrednosti, medtem ko se med senzorji najbolj izkaže pospeškometer, ki
mu sledita žiroskop in senzorji sile.
Po naravi so skupinski algoritmi, poleg klasifikacije, sposobni tudi napo-
vedi verjetnosti razredov. To lastnost smo izkoristili predvsem pri napovedi
napadov pri nenehni avtentikaciji, vendar se prvič srečamo z njo že pri na-
povedi uporabnikov. Če pogledamo sliko 6.4, ki predstavlja verjetnost pra-
vilnega razreda, ko smo napovedali pravega (true vrednosti) in verjetnost
pravilnega razreda, ko smo napovedali napačnega uporabnika (false vredno-
sti) lahko takoj opazimo razhajanje med “zaupanjem” naključnega gozdu, da
je napovedal pravilnega uporabnika. Glede na prikazane rezultate bi lahko
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celo analitično določili mejo, ki nam pove ali se je klasifikator zmotil pri
napovedi.
V Nenehna avtentikacija
Druga metoda, zaobjeta v tem delu, se osredotoča na vedenje uporabnika
znotraj posamezne seanse. Ker se kontekst uporabnikovih akcije nepretr-
goma spreminja, kar lahko potrdimo tudi na podlagi podatkov naših eksperi-
mentov, je uporaba stareǰsih podatkov, ali celo podatkov stareǰsih seans ne-
smotrna. Tako v tem razdelku vpeljemo termin časovnega okna n-predhodnih
meritev, ki v izračun novega modela vzame n preǰsnjih meritev trenutne seje.
Predpostavimo, da se uporabnik na začetku vsake seje avtenticira bodisi z
geslom bodisi z RFID kartico, nato pa vajeti v roke prevzame nenehna av-
tentikacija. Napad, ki ga želimo preprečiti z našim sistemom sestavljata
legitimni in zlonamerni uporabnik. Legitimni uporabnik se avtenticira na
enega od omenjenih načinov in nato zapusti delovno okolje, brez, da bi se
izpisal iz sistema. Na tej točki vskoči zlonamerni uporabnik, ki prevzame
sejo in brez nadzora nenehne avtentikacije lahko prosto dostopa do vsega do
česar ima dostop legitimni uporabnik. Zavoljo čimpogosteǰse avtentikacije
uporabnika, v tem razdelku uporabljamo interval časovnega segmenta ene
sekunde.
Za čimbolǰso uspešnost našega sistema, najprej razǐsčemo prostor različnih
vrednosti parametra n = {10, 25, 50, 100} predhodnih vrednosti. Tako se
sprehodimo čez podatke posameznih nalog, sekundo po sekundo, upoštevajoč
n preǰsnjih meritev in klasificiramo podatke vsakega uporabnika v enega iz-
med razredov uporabnikov. Rezultati tega so prikazani na sliki 7.1 in izkaže
se, da ni večjih razlik v točnosti med izborom različnih vrednosti parametra
n. Zato se osredotočimo na manǰse vrednosti, saj manǰse število podatkov kot
vhod v naključni gozd pomeni kraǰsi čas izračuna, kar je ključno, če želimo
ustvariti nov napovedni model vsako sekundo.
Ključ našega sistema nenehne avtentikacije leži v intervalih zaupanja,
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oziroma porazdelitvi verjetnosti razredov pri napovedi uporabnika. Podobno
kot smo navedli v preǰsnjem razdelku, je razlika v verjetnosti razreda med
pravilno in napančno napovedanimi primeri tolikšna, da lahko analitično
določimo prag, ki loči pravilno in napačno napovedane primere. Zato smo
izvedli podobno analizo, vendar tokrat na nivoju uporabnika, saj nas za-
nima ali ta ločnica velja za vse. Če pogeldamo rezulate na sliki 7.2 lahko
to potrdimo, saj je meja med verjetnosti pravilno in napačno napovedanega
uporabnika znova preceǰsnja.
Tako smo pridobili vse potrebne informacije in vrednosti parametrov za
zasnovo sistema nenehne avtentikacije. Končni sistem deluje tako, da vsako
sekundo vzame n preǰsnjih meritev trenutne seje in časovno poravnanih sej
ostalih uporabnikov. Za ovrednotenje sistema smo se osredotočili na prvo
nalogo. Zatem izvede postopek izbora značilk in učenja modela, kot je opi-
sano v razdelku IV. Nato na podlagi izračunanega modela poda verjetnosti
posameznega uporabnika. Pri statično določenem pragu na koncu določi ali
je verjetnost razreda trenutnega uporabnika dovolj visoka, da lahko označimo
podatke kot napad, ali sistem meni, da je v okolju še vedno legitimni upo-
rabnik, ki je začel trenutno sejo.
Za ovrednotenje sistema smo po vzoru modela grožnje, predstavljenega
na začetku tega razdelka, pripravili scenarij, kjer iz podatkov uporabnikov
naenkrat izločimo dva uporabnika. Sprehodimo se čez vse takšne pare, kjer
vsakič vsak izmed para ločeno nastopa kot legitimni in zlonamerni uporabnik.
Podatke teh dveh uporabnikov združimo, tako da vzamemo prvo polovico
podatkov legitimnega uporabnika in drugo polovico podatkov zlonamernega
uporabnika ter tako združene podatke vstavimo nazaj v nabor podatkov
preostalih uporabnikov. S tem simuliramo napad prevzema seje približno
na njeni polovici. Sprehodimo se med različnimi vrednostmi pragu še legi-
timnega uporabnika in opazujemo trende štirih različnih metrik, relevantnih
na področju nenehne avtentikacije.
Te metrike so: (a) stopnja lažnih zavrnitev (false rejection rate – FRR),
ki meri kolikokrat smo legitimnega uporabnika označili za zlonamernega,
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(b) stopnja lažnih sprejemov (false acceptance rate – FAR), ki meri koliko-
krat smo zlonamernega uporabnika označili za legitimnega, (c) izenačitvena
stopnja napak (equal error rate), ki povezuje FRR in FAR v eno vrednost,
tam kjer se FRR in FAR sekata ter (d) zamik med začetkom napada in nje-
govo zaznavo. Rezultati prvih treh metrik so prikazani na sliki 7.3 in rezultati
zamikov na sliki 7.4. Po pričakovanjih se z dvigajočim pragom vrednost FRR
povečuje in vrednost FAR zmanǰsuje, saj z zvǐsevanjem praga povzročimo, da
je vse več primerov označenih kot napad. Najbolǰsi dosežen ERR (7.9%) do-
bimo z vrednostjo n-predhodnega okna 20 sekund, pri pragu 0,58. Prav tako
pričakovano z rastočim pragom, pada časovni zamik za zaznavo napada.
Za končni rezultat se osredotočimo na dva ločena scenarija – prvi, v ka-
terem je varnost najvǐsjega pomena in moramo, tudi na račun motenj legi-
timnih uporabnikov, zagotoviti čimhitreǰso zaznavo napada in drugi, kjer ne
želimo motiti legitimnih uporabnikov, vendar še vedno zagotoviti visoko sto-
pnjo varnosti. Po dodatni raziskavi ugotovimo, da lahko v prvem scenariju
dosežemo povprečno zaznavo napada v desetih sekundah, kjer je FRR manǰsi
od 1%, tako da nastavimo vrednosti n na 5 sekund in prag na 0,35. Drugi
scenarij pa uspešno zazna napad po petdesetih sekundah in je vrednost FRR
zanemarljiva. To dosežemo pri vrednosti n 40 sekund in pragu 0,375. Na
koncu še omenimo, da je naš sistem zaznal 99,3% vseh napadov.
VI Zaključek
V našem delu odkrijemo, da lahko ponudimo alternativni pristop avtentika-
ciji, ki temelji na občutljivih podatkih, potrebuje dostop do uporabniku la-
stne naprave [26] ali je omejena na specifična okolja in aplikacije [32, 41]. To
storimo z večmodalni pristopom, ki se s pomočjo tehnologij interneta stvari
osredotoča na zgolj neobčutljive podatke. Najprej razǐsčemo informativnost
posameznih senzorjev, kjer ugotovimo, da “bližje” kot je senzor uporabniku,
bolj jasno lahko razlikujemo med različnimi uporabniki in tako ugotovimo,
da so pospeškometer, žiroskop in senzorji sile dovolj natančni za 68% točnost
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prepoznave uporabnikov. Glavni razlog, ki nam preprečuje vǐsjo točnost je
spremenljivost uporabnikovega vedenja. Opazimo lahko, da tudi ko so upo-
rabniki večkrat soočeni z isto nalogo, le-te opravijo na precej drugačen način.
kPosledično to pomeni, da so podatki preǰsnjih sej za nenehno avtentikacijo
uporabnika neuporabni. Nasprotno so kratkoročne, predhodne meritve ko-
ristne pri zaznavanju trenutnih vzorcev vedenja. Na podlagi tega na koncu
zasnujemo in sestavimo sistem nenehne avtentikacije, ki temelji na nepretrga-
nem osveževanju modela s pravkar zajetimi podatki in je sposoben zanesljivo
preprečiti prevzem seje zlonamernega uporabnika. Poleg objave dela je prosto
dostopna tudi podatkovna zbirka, zbrana z opisanimi eksperimenti, ter pro-
gramska koda, zadolžena za obdelavo podatkov in aplikacijo algoritmov stroj-




Data privacy and access control are becoming increasingly important as the
growth of ubiquitous computing leads to the expansion of both the num-
ber of points where the data is collected, stored, and accessed from, as well
as the range of domains in which the data is used. Authentication is the
staple method for ensuring access control, yet, traditional password-based
authentication remains plagued with security and usability issues [1, 2]. A
recent survey finds that privileged access credential abuse represents 74% of
all security breaches in US and UK companies [42]; consequently, more than
$100 billion are spent every year on corporate cybersecurity [42]. The failure
of traditional authentication methods is even more prominent in service-
based multi-user environments – the clash of a burdensome password-based
(re)authentication and the need for a timely reaction is most clearly observed
in hospital emergency rooms. In one hospital the authors of an aptly named
“You want my password or a dead patient” article find the code for accessing
emergency supply room written on the room doors, since preventing authen-
tication due to a forgotten code can lead to fatal consequences [43].
Moving from “what you know” to “what you are”, biometric information
enables authentication based on a user’s fingerprint, iris scan, voice, gait, and
other properties. While relieving the user from the burden of remembering
a password, current commodity biometric solutions still rely on explicit user
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authentication at the beginning of an access session and later assume that
the same user keeps the privileges until explicit de-authentication or a time-
out. Despite the benefits, imposing such a one-off authentication solution in
a dynamic environment shared by users of different access privileges, such
as a hospital or a hotel reception desk, would unlikely improve the overall
security. Thus, a surgeon authenticated by a fingerprint might be rushed to
an emergency room, meanwhile an unintended user might snitch the terminal.
Another issue arises due to the perceived intrusiveness of biometric-based
solutions – even in more private environments, such as smart homes, users
are uncomfortable with the collection of biometric data [3].
Behavioural biometrics can address these limitations by creating a more
complete user profile, through the analysis of certain user traits during every-
day tasks over a time dimension [4]. Furthermore, by shifting authentication
from a one-off occurrence to a continuous activity, behavioural biometrics
also addresses the problem of keeping a device secure even after it has been
unlocked: continuous authentication (CA) ensures that, throughout the us-
age session, the authenticated user indeed remains the one accessing the re-
source. Traditional biometric information, face recognition, can be harnessed
for continuous authentication. Nevertheless, due to the data sensitivity and
the need for high security protection, CA solutions based on “soft” digital
identities inferred from data that are not considered personal or sensitive,
emerge as a more attractive alternative. Such soft identities are often cre-
ated by service providers in order to distinguish, identify, and monitor users
as unique digital entities, while they navigate online [44, 45]. For instance,
HTTP cookies are used for session management, personalisation, and user
tracking, as HTTP is a stateless protocol, while web beacons are used mainly
to track users when navigating from one web site to another. Yet, neither
of these, nor approaches that rely solely on device and web browser finger-
printing [46, 47, 48] can provide strong indicators for user identification, as
another entity might use exact the same device or browser, or follow the same
sequence of URLs.
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Projected to surpass the 75 billion deployed devices in 2025 [5], the In-
ternet of Things (IoT) represents an attractive source of data upon which
future continuous authentication solutions could be based. Data sensed by a
personal computing device, including the user’s GPS location, acceleration,
and other modalities sensed by a mobile phone, already contain enough in-
formation to detect when a rogue user gets into the possession of the mobile
phone [49]. On the other hand, the informativeness of data collected by
sensor-enabled devices associated with a particular environment, rather than
devices carried by the intended user, is yet to be assessed. These data, how-
ever, could prove immensely important for CA in multiuser environments.
Non-sensitive data originating from heterogeneous IoT devices, such as ac-
celerometers, gyroscopes, force sensors, passive infrared (PIR) sensors, could
potentially reveal enough information on user behaviour to make constructing
digital identities for CA feasible. Furthermore, IoT environments alleviate
the need to equip each user with their own device (a smartphone) and avoid
a single point of failure. Finally, a large number of cheap heterogeneous
sensors could easily be deployed in almost any space and could provide a
multifaceted robust view of a user’s behaviour.
In this work we advance beyond a single location/device and a single-
point-in-time authentication and develop an approach for continuous authen-
tication in an IoT environment. We commence with the analysis of the in-
formativeness of different IoT sensors and their corresponding features when
it comes to user authentication. We develop an experimental IoT testbed ar-
chitecture consisting of different types of sensors such as accelerometer, gyro-
scope, force, PIR, etc., and computational systems (a PC, a WiFi network),
similar to a range of modern workplaces. In the above testbed, we collect data
generated by up to twenty users pertaining to their movement in space, inter-
action with certain physical objects, PC terminal usage and keyboard typing,
and construct machine learning models capturing the participants’ behaviour
traits. Using our random forest-based model these behaviour patterns are
sufficient for independent user authentication with above 60% accuracy (c.f.
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7% baseline). However, when harnessed as a means to confirm the identity
of an already authenticated user, behaviour models extracted from IoT data
provide more than 99% accuracy and successfully prevent an attack scenario
in which a rogue user takes over a previously authenticated session.
The main contributions of our work can be summarised as follows:
1. We identify the most informative sensors and features for IoT-based
authentication in office-like scenarios. Namely, those related to a PC
terminal and work-desk interaction;
2. We develop an authentication mechanism that relies solely on non-
sensitive data gathered from the environment;
3. We identify limited temporal persistence of the sensed behaviour traits
and advocate for continually updated authentication models;
4. We devise a CA solution that confirms an already-authenticated user’s
identity with up to 99.3% accuracy;
5. Harnessing the classifier confidence we develop an approach that suc-
cessfully detects credentials abuse in an IoT environment after only 12
seconds with less than 1% false rejection rate;
6. We publicly release our dataset as well as the accompanying analy-
sis and models, thus facilitate further efforts in IoT-based continuous
authentication research.
Our study is conducted in a carefully designed office-like IoT testbed;
nevertheless, we believe that the tremendous growth of IoT device popularity
will soon make our findings applicable to a wide range of environments, from
hospitals, over enterprises, to factories. Furthermore, while in this work we
focus on authentication, behaviour modelling demonstrated in this thesis
could also be used for service personalisation, for example. In summary, we
believe that sensor-based behaviour modelling represents the next step in
making our IoT environments genuinely smart.
Chapter 2
Related Work
Most day to day authentication still relies on the user to come up with and
remember a pin code or a password. Despite best efforts to improve security
of passwords [6, 7], while minimising user distraction [7, 8], there is still a key
element of the system that fails over and over again – the user. To relieve her
of burden of passwords, there are many different techniques that exclude the
user as an active component of authentication. Instead these techniques focus
on users’ traits, habits and behavioural patterns. Furthermore, instead of a
single authentication at the start, they often monitor the user throughout the
session, ensuring that user is still who she claims to be. These techniques are
commonly known as Continuous Authentication (CA). In this chapter we will
present some of these techniques, including their advantages, shortcomings
and relation to our work.
2.1 Keystroke Dynamics
The first group of techniques we inspect is keystroke dynamics. As we can
interpolate from the name, keystroke dynamics relies on the users’ typing
patterns. These approaches mostly focus on the duration of each key press
and the duration between the key presses which are unique enough to avail
the system to discern among multiple users as presented in [9, 10, 11]. Fur-
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thermore, Mondal et al. introduced an approach where keystroke dynamics is
augmented with mouse dynamics, not only registering the behavioural traits
of the keyboard usage, but mouse usage as well [12]. Most of these approaches
obtain excellent accuracy when classifying users (up to 100%) and an equal
error rate of below 1% in CA experiments. However a common trait of these
techniques is the constant, letter by letter, monitoring of what the user is
typing, which presents a security issue, as a malicious user can reconstruct
private information, including user names and passwords from the collected
data. Similarly, in our work, we employ an accelerometer and a gyroscope
sensors, which jointly try to accomplish the same task, while eliminating the
need to gather potentially private user data.
2.2 Face Recognition
Face recognition is another thriving area, whose approaches are closely bound
to authentication and continuous authentication. Similarly to keystroke dy-
namics, it presents an unobtrusive form of user authentication, as it does
not require a user to knowingly interact with any type of device or sensor.
A front-facing camera on any modern smart phone or laptop is sufficient to
perform face recognition. State-of-the-art face detection, which is a precon-
dition for face recognition, is now achieving almost perfect results [13], and
with different approaches and applications in recognition [14, 15, 16, 17] it
is a promising area that is already replacing single point authentication for
unlocking smart phones, as well as some laptops. Of course there are still
drawbacks that hinder the performance of such algorithms, such as the dis-
tance and angle between the person and the camera, low light conditions and
most recently widespread issue – face masks or other more concealing head
wear. We choose not to include any type of face recognition, as we focus on
the user privacy, which these techniques do not provide, mainly because of
the image capturing nature of the approach.
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2.3 Computer Usage Patterns
Exploiting the fact that every user has a unique PC usage pattern, the fol-
lowing approaches use different computer resources metrics, CPU, memory
and network usage [18], web browsing behaviour [19] or process creation,
registry key changes and file system action [20] to identify the user. Once
more some of these techniques have privacy concerns, hence we only include
the collection of information about the CPU, memory and network usage.
2.4 Mobile Phones
Our work focuses on an office-like environment, where users’ most important
tool is still a desktop or a laptop computer. Nevertheless, the omnipresence
of mobile phones pivoted the research community into devising many CA
approaches for mobile phones [21]. From keystroke and touch dynamics,
which rely on the users’ typing pattern via the key press behaviour [22]
or accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer measurements [23, 24, 25],
through behaviour profiling [26, 27, 28, 29] and up to gait dynamics [30, 31]
which identify a person based on their walking patterns. For now we do not
focus on including mobile phones into our system, though the potential of a
device that everyone carries at any time and it comes with a multitude of
sensors is hard to overlook and should be considered in future work.
2.5 Multi-Modal Approaches
Similarly to the system presented in this work, the last group of CA ap-
proaches we present are multi-modal approaches. Techniques used here fo-
cus on combining different devices, sensors and CA techniques in order to
improve the overall accuracy and consequently security of the system. The
reasoning for such an approach is based on the saying two heads are better
than one, meaning that with an increase of information gathered from an
environment, we expect an increase in the accuracy of the system. There
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are many concepts that exploit this, some of which are closely related to
our work, aptly named “The House That Knows You: User Authentication
Based on IoT Data” [32], which employs many different home-based IoT de-
vices and controls network data of them, achieving 86% and 97% accuracy
when identifying users. Another example is the article by Deutschmann et
al. which combines keystroke and mouse dynamics with application usage
and CPU and memory consumption [33] and uses a very similar CA algo-
rithm to the one in our proposed system. Furthermore, there are systems
that combine gait dynamics with EEG signals [34] or facial recognition [35].
Even with these approaches, despite reaching enviable results, there are some
shortcomings. Either their scope is limited to a single environment, for ex-
ample a home with only a few family members or, as already mentioned in
previous sections, the issue of privacy still arises through gathering personal
user information. We believe that a system like ours has a potential to cater
to a myriad of scenarios, while retaining user privacy.
Chapter 3
IoT Testbed Architecture
With the many different approaches to continuous authentication already
explored, one would believe that password authentication will already be a
thing of the past. As this is not the case we implement an IoT experimental
testbed in order to gather behavioural user data through different experi-
ments, conducted at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Computer and
Information Science. Our goal is to recreate an office-like environment in
which a user interacts with the office space, most prominently a workstation-
like computer. The gathered data is used to analyse the informativeness
of the sensors deployed in our environment and the features, derived from
that sensors. This chapter gives an overview of the hardware and software
choices we make and the implementation approaches we choose to provide a
stable, scalable and high performing system, which can be reused in differ-
ent applications and will serve us in data collection beyond the scope of this
work.
One of the most important aspects of any IoT ecosystem is the choice
of tools which we use to sense the activities around us and then store, pro-
cess and employ them in a timely, secure and user-friendly manner. Hence
every piece of equipment and software we use is chosen based on previous
experience, testing and current industry trends to ensure our environment
architecture is performing to its maximal potential and is relevant in its time.
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Figure 3.1: High-level architecture diagram, presenting the three major
components of our proposed system
Our testbed consists of three major components:
1. Server,
2. Network and
3. Microcontrollers and Sensors.
In Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we present the aforementioned components and
wrap it up with a description of the testbed layout in Section 3.4. Further-
more, a high-level representation of the architecture is presented in Figure 3.1
and images of the actual testbed are shown in Figure 3.2.
3.1 Network
To maintain low set up time and reduce system complexity, we use the WiFi
network technology to send sensor data from the devices to the server. We
set up our own WiFi router whose sole purpose is to serve as a gateway for
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the IoT microcontrollers to connect to the internet. Furthermore we test
the performance of such set up, before performing any of the experiments in
order to validate it and prevent data loss, due to the instability of wireless
technologies. We report that, with some rare exceptions, there were no major
issues or interruptions of data flow in both the validation and the experiments
itself. The only exception to the usage of WiFi technologies was the data
sent from the PC monitor. As the testing computer is already connected to
the Internet via an ethernet connection we use it to send sensor data as well.
On the application layer, we take advantage of the MQTT message trans-
port protocol1 as its features are tailor made to be used in lightweight IoT
networks like ours. It provides a simple naming scheme that enables us an
almost trivial device and sensor recognition, without unneccessary overhead
that would choke our desired sampling rate.
3.2 Server
The basic server architecture consists of seven separate components, common
goal of most is to ensure that the received data is processed and stored in
the database in real-time. Mission critical components are the data modules,
which are purposed to receive, process and store sensors data. With the
exception of the database processes, all components are run and monitored
using the Supervisor2 process control system.
3.2.1 Database
We choose the PostgreSQL3 database, along with the TimescaleDB4 ex-
tension in order to take the advantage of both, realtional and time series
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ing to the Django framework, with plenty of resources on how to setup and
maintain such a system.
The database schema consists of seven tables which are split into two
separate logical entities; a) Data entity and b) Seance entity. The Data
entity is primarily concerned with efficient storage of all received sensor data.
Seance entity on the other hand is purposed for handling the experiment
meta data. All tables share the created and modified fields, which store a
timestamp of creation and last modification time of every record and will be
omitted for the rest of this section as are not relevant in the scope of our
work.
The Data entity consists of three separate tables:
• Record table is the most important table of the database, as it holds
all collected sensor data. It is a prerequisite for the system to func-
tion properly that this data can be stored and retrieved in real-time
at large quantities simultaneously. This is the only table of the sys-
tem that takes the advantage of the TimescaleDB extension and for all
functions and purposes operates as a time series database within Post-
greSQL relational database. As such it sadly disables some built-in
functionalities of the Django ORM and even PostgreSQL itself, which
have to be handled manually (the foreign key to the sensor table). The
value field holds a float value of each sensor reading. As there are some
binary sensors present in the system, we denote their readings with 0
and 1 values. The time field hold the timestamp of the sensors reading
(not to be confused with the created field). Then there are the id and
the sensor id values, which uniquely denote each record and link it to
a certain sensor.
• Sensor table groups records from the Record table by the sensor,
from which the data is sent. Each record in this table is mapping of a
physical sensor, used in the experiments. The topic field corresponds to
the mqtt topic used by this sensor, while the name field is user defined
and solely used for easier recognition. Similarly to the Record table,
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the id and the device id are used to uniquely identify every sensor, as
well as link it to the microcontroller to which the sensor is attached.
• Device table further groups the sensors by the device that they are
connected to. Each record in this table corresponds to a physical mi-
crocontroller that has one or more sensors connected to it. Instead
of using an auto increment integer id field, we utilise the universally
unique identifier numbers (version 4), which enables easier handling
and device recognition. Each uuid field is created at the creation time
of a device. The qr code field stores a qrcode in a png format, which is
reserved for future use (adding a device in a mobile application). The
name field has the same function as in the Sensor table.
The Seance entity consist of four separate tables, one of which is an al-
ready built-in Django table. The initial idea was to name this entity Session,
but due to the fact that it clashes with the already built-in Django table of
the same name, we choose the name Seance. The tables of this entity are:
• Seance table holds data related to a single experiment conduction
(one experiment session). The start and end fields store the times-
tamps of the starting and ending time of each seance. The active field
contains a boolean value which denotes if the seance is still ongoing –
the lifecycle of its value starts as true and it stays true till the moment
of receiving the signal to end the seance when it changes to false and
does not change anymore. The valid field also contains a boolean value
which tells if the seance is valid to us for later analysis. There are many
different reason to invalidate a seance – improper conduction of the ex-
periment, testing, etc. The notes field is used to note any irregularities
or observations that occur during a given seance. The try count and
experiment id are directly related. As explained in Chapter 4, each test
subject performs the experiment tasks in a certain order, so the system
is able to automatically detect which task (experiment id) and for the
which time (try count) is the participant performing. The user id field
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is a foreign key that connects every seance to a single user and the id
field uniquely identifies each seance.
• Experiment table maps to each of the devised tasks, presented in
Chapter 4. The sequence number field is an integer that represents the
sequence of the tasks and the instructions hold the instructions of each
of the experiments (written in english).
• User table is a built-in Django table that takes care of user handling.
It contains much more fields and functionalities than presented but are
not relevant in the scope of our work. All fields are named in a self-
explanatory way and we only utilise the username field of the table.
To enable the functionalities we want to achieve, we construct a one-
to-one realted User Profile table to extend the User table with some
additional fields we use in our system.
• User Profile table is used to extend the User table with additional
fields that we utilise for user handling. The rfid field connects every user
with an rfid card, which they use when conducting the experiments.
The uuid field is used to connect the map every user to the consent
forms every user has to fill in before starting the experiment.
3.2.2 Data Worker
Data worker is responsible for dequeueing messages from the RabbitMQ5
message broker. This message broker is running on the same server as all the
other components presented in this section. The data worker extracts the
sensor data from the collected messages, process them and insert them into
the database. It takes the messages from queue one by one. Each message
contains sensor data for one second of a given seance. The worker first checks
if there is or was an active seance present at the time of the records, if there
is not, it discards the data and moves onto the next message. The data that
5https://www.rabbitmq.com/
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falls under the time span of a seance is then processed, one record at a time.
A record object with each value, timestamp and sensor id is created. Finally
all objects are inserted into the database with a single bulk insert call.
3.2.3 Managers
The role of every manager in our system is to subscribe to the Mosquitto
MQTT broker and react to the published messages, sent by the microcon-
trollers. We implement three such managers, each assigned to manage a
different aspect of the whole system:
• Base Manager is a base class, extended by other managers and it is
not used in the system as such. It contains MQTT connection logic
that is common to all other managers.
• Data Manager subscribes to the sensor data topics on the MQTT
broker and inserts received data into cache. Cache is implemented in a
form of a built-in Python list. Once every second this cache is emptied
and the content of it is inserted into the RabbitMQ message brokers’
queue and then processed by the Data Worker.
• Device Manager is devised to be employed for a two-way communi-
cation with devices. The structure of the MQTT messages and MQTT
subtopics is formulated with future extensions in mind. At this stage it
is used for device “introduction”. To elaborate, on each microcontroller
startup procedure, the microcontroller “introduces” itself by sending its
id and name to the Device Manager. Based on the received informa-
tion, a new record is inserted into the device table of the database.
• Seance Manager is reponsible for subscribing to the seance related
topics and listen for the signals coming from the rfid reader equipped
microcontroller. All communication is again initiated by the micro-
controller, which sends a request message with an RFID of the user
as the payload. The Seance manager acknowledges the message with
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a response, initialises a new seance by inserting a new record in the
seance table and sends another message when the initialisation process
is complete. Similar procedure, but in a reverse order, takes place when
the seance is completed. We will elaborate on this procedure in Section
3.3.2 which describes the workings of an RFID reader.
3.2.4 Authenticator
The authentication component is implemented after the experiments and
the initial research was completed. It utilizes the collected knowledge to
continuously authenticate the current user, using real time data from the
sensors. We achieve an iteration running time of two seconds, which means
that the user is authenticated once in that time interval. Longer running
time occur due to the fact that the Authenticator has to process new data
and generate a new machine learning model in every iteration. The inner
workings and the achieved results of it are presented in Chapter 7.
3.3 Sensors and microcontrollers
The most complex element of our system are the data producing modules
of sensors and microcontrollers. For its known ease of use and a large user
community we choose to implement all microcontrollers’ firmware using the
Arduino Platform6 mostly due to its simplicity while providing us with the
functionality we desire. Below we first describe the Node MCU microcon-
troller, then the used sensors and finally a custom Python Arduino Wrapper.
3.3.1 Node MCU
Our system bases on the WiFi technology to send sensor data. Therefore
opting for the ESP 8266 based, Node MCU microcontrollers is an obvious
choice as they already come with an integrated WiFi adapter. They are also
6https://www.arduino.cc/
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relatively inexpensive and capable of handling all types of sensors that we
plan on using in our system. More so due to the fact that each microcon-
troller is only responsible for a single sensor in order to maintain as high
as possible sampling rate. Moreover, introducing new types of sensors only
requires writing a new piece of firmware, specific for that sensor. Arduino
compatibility is also provided by installing an appropriate library within the
Arudino software. To power the boards in the environment we use 5V-1A
phone USB chargers, which are the most sensible solution, due to the abun-
dance of power sockets throughout the environment. This enables us to
obtain a sampling rate of roughly 200Hz for the accelerometer, gyroscope
and force sensors in our experiments. However lowering the said sampling
rate would even permit us to power the microcontrollers on batteries, thus
greatly enlarging the types of environments in which we would be able to
deploy our system. As shown in Chapters 6 and 7, a reduced sampling rate
would not greatly affect the performance of our approach.
3.3.2 Sensors
After defining the types of sensors we will utilise in our system, the choice
of actual sensors is influenced by the current industry trend and prelimi-
nary testing, also keeping in mind the overall cost of the system and sensor
availability. Below we briefly present each of the chosen sensors.
Force Sensors (df9-40)
The df9-40 is a flexible, film force sensor whose electrical resistance changes
based on the amount of force applied to it. We implement four of these
sensors – one for each corner of our proposed pressure plate, which sits under
the mouse and keyboard in front of the user (top left image in Figure 3.2).
Each sensor is connected to its own Node MCU via the analog pin. The values
we expect are on a scale from 0 to 1023, as the analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) of the Node MCU is 10 bit.
18 CHAPTER 3. IOT TESTBED ARCHITECTURE
These sensors come in different maximum load variants, therefore we
perform an initial test to determine which variant is optimal to use in our
experiment. The variants of the sensors we test are: 0.5kg, 2kg, 5kg, 10kg and
20kg. Initially we have to devise a mechanism that sufficiently translates the
applied force from the pressure plate to the sensors. In the end we utilise a
sphere-shaped rubber furniture feet and some sticky tape to keep the sensors
in place, even when the pressure plate is moving. Analyzing the response of
each sensor variant while using the computer for a few minutes, we choose to
use the 20kg variant sensors. It was the only sensor that did not ”max out´´
during the testing phase and provides detail enough response that should
discern among different users.
As we are not interested in the actual value of force being exerted to each
sensor, we leave the measured values in the arbitrary scale of 0-1023.
Passive IR Sensors (hc-sr501)
Passive Infrared (PIR) sensors are widely used in motion detection and as
such were an obvious choice for our office environment. We implement six of
these sensors by connecting each one to its own microcontroller and position
them around the room.
We learn from initial testing that these sensors are highly sensitive and
require some tuning as initially all sensors detected movement the moment
a person entered the environment. To mitigate this, there are two poten-
tiometers on each sensor – one addresses the sensing distance and the other
addresses the sensing delay. We set both of them to the lowest possible value.
This provides us with a detection range of approximately three meters and a
delay time between readings of five seconds. We also install a housing around
each of the sensors in order to limit their angle of vision as much as possible.
The values sent to the database are binary and are only sent on state
change – true value when there is movement and false when there is none.
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Hall Effect Sensors (ky-035)
Detecting the opening and closing events of the boxes in task 3 (described
in Section 4.1), we utilise the ky-035 Hall effect sensors. These sensors take
advantage of the Hall effect to detect the strength of the magnetic field. Most
commonly they are used for position, speed and as in our case, proximity
detection.
In our experiment we use 340mm×130mm×105mm shoe boxes, with the
lid attached to the back side of the container. That enables us to attach the
hall sensor to the inside of the container and magnet from an old hard drive
to the lid. When closed, the sensors detects the presence of a magnet, this
changes the moment a participant opens the box and removes the magnet
from the vicinity of the sensor and oppositely when the box is closed back.
While being able to detect the strength of a magnetic field, our interest
lies only in the opening and closing of the lid. Thus, we, similarly to the
PIR sensors, treat Hall effect sensors as binary sensors – true value when
the magnet is in proximity of the sensors (box closed) and false when the
magnet is removed (box open).
Accelerometer and Gyroscope (mpu6050)
As it later turns out, our most informative sensor is the combined accelerom-
eter and gyroscope (IMU) 6-axis sensor, installed on the top of the keyboard,
primarily focused on the positioning and typing characteristics of a specific
user. It measures the acceleration and angular velocity of the x, y and z axis.
Radio-frequency Identification Reader (rc522)
The Radio-frequency Identification reader (RFID), is used as an efficient tool
that starts and finish every experiment run (seance), while identifying the
user when she taps the id card against the reader. As such, it was not used
to collect any kind of sensoric data, but only to streamline the experimental
process, as seance and user tagging was done automatically.
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3.3.3 Python Arduino Wrapper
As microcontrollers usually cannot be visually distinguished, we implement a
simple protocol for deploying new and redeploying already active devices and
their handling in the backend. The protocol we follow includes the following
steps:
1. Implementing the Arduino firmware is the prerequisite step if we
want to deploy a device. We implement a custom library that handles
the WiFi and MQTT communications and it is used by all the firmware
implementations of specific sensors. We also implement a template
arduino file with everything set for someone to pick up the process as
quickly as possible.
2. Specify the settings in a separate Python file. To ensure proper
functionality, settings regarding the WiFi and MQTT credentials and
MQTT topics must be defined. Some additional settings are present
by default and are set dynamically, the device id (uuid4).
3. Deployment is the last step of the devised protocol. It is what the
title of this subsection refers to – Python Arduino wrapper. In order
to be able to dynamically set a device id and other options set in the
previous step, we implement an Arduino verifying and flashing wrapper.
It is implemented in a form of a Django manage.py command. In the
background we call Arduino commands verify and upload through the
terminal, using the subprocess module.
This wrapper presents an improvement in the ease and speed of device
deployment, as we no longer have to manually define ids and check which
device belongs where. That is especially helpful with the force, PIR and Hall
sensors due to the fact that there were multitude of those sensors, each with
its own device, present in the environent.
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3.4 Experimental Testbed Layout
Combining everything together, we devise an experimental testbed which is
used in the conduction of our experiments. We recreated a single person
office-like environment, including everyday office furniture and a computer
with which the user interacts. Furthermore, the environment is equipped
with the aforementioned sensors, as well as all the supporting equipment,
making the setup functional. The testbed is presented in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: Images from the actual testbed. LEFT TOP: A user performing
Task 1, with the force sensors on the corners of the plate, the accelerometer
and the gyroscope on the keyboard, and the PC along with all the peripherals
visible. LEFT BOTTOM: One of the six infrared sensors in its peephole box.
We took advantage of the many power sockets throughout the environment,
thus all microcontrollers are powered of the wall sockets. RIGHT: One of
the boxes used in Task 3. On the far top there is a Hall sensor (red) with
the magnet from an old HDD attached to the lid of the box.





































Figure 3.3: Experimental testbed layout, including sensor and relevant
objects positioning and room and FSR board dimensions.
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Chapter 4
Experiment
With the experimental testbed set up, the next step is to gather as much
user data as possible by inviting people to perform three experimental tasks.
We surpass our initial goal of twenty participants by successfully completing
twenty-one sets of tasks with just as many participating users. Therefore,
in this chapter, we present the three devised tasks in Section 4.1, and then
describe the participants demographics, statistics of the resulting dataset
and some observations about the applications used in the experiments in
Section 4.2.
4.1 Experimental Tasks and Data Collection
Protocol
We devise the following experimental tasks to simulate common user actions
in a smart environment, and collect data pertaining to these actions and
sampled by sensors that are a part of the architecture defined in Chapter 3.
Table 4.1 lists tasks length statistics and the amount of data gathered on
average.
1. The first task instructs a user to send an email with a predetermined
text written on a card found under the terminal’s keyboard. The text is
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about 600 characters long; to prevent shortcuts (copy-pasting) between
the first and the second run of the task, we use a different text for the
two runs. The content of the two texts can be found in Appendix A.
The main focus of this task is to stimulate varied responses from the
accelerometer and the gyroscope attached to the keyboard, as most of
the time in this task is spent typing.
2. The second task is intentionally less linear to encourage individual com-
puter usage patterns. The test subjects are instructed to check the
weather forecast for a certain geographical region or country for the
following few days and, based on the result, to suggest three tourist
attractions to visit, and send their recommendations via email. The
choice of the region or the country is left to the subjects, but it has to
differ between the two runs of the tasks. The sensor we are targeting in
this task is the PC resource usage monitor, as users are not instructed
which programs, tools, or websites to use to accomplish this task.
3. The third task does not only include interaction with the PC, but
also introduces indoor mobility. In particular, in a form of a “treasure
hunt”. The test subjects have to search for a series of labelled boxes
in the room and follow the instructions (presented in Appendix B)
in each box. The instructions require the subjects to use the PC to
compile a data table, generate a graph, and send the graph via email.
In addition, before leaving the room, the test subjects are asked to reset
the experiment. With respect to user movement, an additional degree
of freedom is introduced with the presence of a large obstacle (a row
of tables) in the middle of the room, forcing the subjects to navigate
around it by going either to the left or the right of it. Due to extensive
movement, in this task we obtain richer PIR and hall sensor data.
The experimental process starts when a test user taps her RFID key card
for the first time at a reader installed at the room entrance. The subject
completes the above three tasks in the presented order, with a brief rest
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Task 1 (email) 367 s 118 s 213 s 603 s 803 k
Task 2 (Web browsing) 491 s 209 s 202 s 1090 s 1004 k
Task 3 (treasure hunt) 496 s 247 s 255 s 1325 s 986 k
Table 4.1: Task running time statistics, including the mean, standard devi-
ation, minimum and maximum running time of the task of the filtered data
in seconds. Last column represents the average amount of recorded data
points of a given task in thousands (k).
period between the consecutive tasks. The subject then performs the second
run of the three tasks in the same order, immediately after the first run is
completed. The subject taps out the RFID card after each task and taps it
in before starting the next one. The final tap out signalises the end of the
experiment session. It should be noted that during the experiment no other
entities, except for the subject under test, are present in the room.
4.2 Data Collection Campaign
We recruited 21 volunteers to participate in our study. The participants’ age
ranges from 23 to 58 years old, 9 of them are female and 12 are male, 12
are students and 9 are employed. All of the participants are healthy adults
without disabilities or any other characteristics that could introduce obvious
variability of the collected data. The participants were not compensated,
monetarily or in any other way, for their participation.
In total, we gather fifteen hours and forty minutes of data in the form of
115,366,524 data points collected by our smart environment’s sensors. Per
run, the first task provides about 800,000 data points on average with a
standard deviation of 25,000 points among users, where the second and the
third task average out at roughly one million data points each with a standard
28 CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT
deviation of 35,000 points.
The participants are free regarding their choice of applications to com-
plete the assignments. Nevertheless a post-experiment discussion with them
reveals that the all used Google Chrome for internet browsing and email ac-
tivities, despite other popular modern browsers (Google Chrome, Microsoft
Edge, Mozilla Firefox and Opera) also being installed and appended to the




In this chapter, we explain the approach for compiling our behavioural bio-
metrics dataset. We present the filtering approach, taken to leave out unfit
participants, expound the process of extracting features from raw data, and
analyse the features extracted for the purpose of further exploration of (con-
tinuous) authentication in IoT environments (Chapters 6 and 7). Recognising
that a multimodal dataset reflecting user behaviour in a smart environment
could facilitate further research on authentication, service personalisation,
and context-based adaptation, producing a precompiled, publicly available
dataset is one of the goals of our work.
5.1 Participants Filtering
From the collected data we first filter out all the data corresponding to task
runs in which the subjects failed to follow the instructions or there were
technical difficulties which resulted in the loss or corruption of data. If one
task run of a user is deemed compromised, both runs of those task of that user
are discarded. The failure to follow instructions is monitored by the control
of the provided content by the participants via email and a post-experiment
discussion with each of the participants. For example, a subject did not
copy the text from the provided card during first task’s session, but only
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sent an email without any or with some random content. Fortunately, those
occurrences were rare. To ensure that quality data is collected we prepare a
real time report generator, with the purpose of reporting the amount of data
each sensor provided over a period of time. With it we are able to detect
faulty sensors or disturbances in WiFi connectivity. Any glitches in data
collection or users’ failure to full comply with the instructions may introduce
artificial differences among subjects’ behaviour and result in an unreasonably
high evaluation accuracy of even the simplest behaviour-based authentication
mechanism. Thus, after rigorously applying the filtering, we retain 17, 20,
and 18 subjects for the first, the second and the third task, respectively.
5.2 Feature Engineering
We extract both time and frequency domain features from the collected data.
With respect to time-domain, we extract features such as mean, standard de-
viation, mean crossing rate, and others, over a time-segment. These features
are commonly used in pervasive sensing, for activity recognition [50]. In addi-
tion, we engineer a new “signal” by combining dimensions from different data
sources, for the accelerometer the data comes along three dimensions (x,y,z);
by using the square root of the sum of squares at every time step within
every time segment, where n represents the count of the sensor readings of







i , i = 1, . . . , n
Such an aggregated (intensity) signal is also calculated for the gyroscope
(three dimensional data) and CPU usage data (four cores). Joining the
signals in such a way is possible due to the fact that there is an equal number
of readings from all the dimensions in every segmented time chunk and these
data points are correlated in time.
We also extract frequency domain features from the accelerometer, the
gyroscope, and the force sensors. This requires that we first apply a Fast
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mean, sd, mean crossing
rate, mean derivative value,
10 Hz frequency bins
39,000,000
Gyroscope
mean, sd, mean crossing
rate, 10 Hz frequency bins
39,000,000
Force sensor
mean, sd, mean crossing
rate, 10 Hz frequency bins
39,000,000
CPU utilisation
mean, sd, minimum, maxi-
mum, mean crossing rate
57,600
Memory consumption
mean, sd, minimum, maxi-
mum, jump-related features
57,600
Network data (num. of
packets)
mean, sd, start-end delta,
jump-related features
57,600
PIR sensor activity class 10 – 1,000
Table 5.1: Features extracted from each of the sensor types. The amount
of data points varies per sensor because of the different sampling rates, with
the infrared data only recorded on change. Range of values of cumulative
amount of data at PIR sensor indicate the on-trigger nature of the sensor,
some PIR sensors are triggered more often than others.
Fourier Transform (FFT) over the different data segments and then calcu-
late the corresponding features. We take each time segment chunk and use
linear interpolation to ensure that we have data points spaced exactly 5 ms
apart. Next, we perform the FFT with the Hann windowing function on
the processed signal and calculate the magnitude at each frequency. As our
sampling rate is precisely 200 Hz, the calculated magnitude range is between
0 Hz and 100 Hz. Finally, we calculate the mean of each 10 Hz frequency
magnitude bin. Table 5.1 lists all of the extracted features.
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We examine the initially extracted features and make the following ob-
servations that guide us towards defining additional features:
1. The PC memory usage signal is mostly stationary with a few variations
that are correlated to users’ behaviour opening or closing a program.
Thus, we introduce the notion of memory ‘jumps’ defined as peak values
of the first derivative of the memory usage signal, and we extract four
related features: (a) count (the number of jumps in a session), rate (the
ratio between the count and the length of the signal), mean value (mean
jump magnitude) and mean inter jump interval (mean time interval
between neighbouring jumps).
2. Network data is of cumulative nature. In fact, we recorded the number
of sent and received network packages from the beginning of the session.
The analysis shows that network data follows patterns similar to the
memory signal. Therefore we reuse the notion of ‘jump’ and we also
extract the cumulative bandwidth used by a task run.
3. Extracting high significance features from infrared sensors is a chal-
lenging task. This is because the sensitivity and the sensing range of
the sensors we utilise (hc-sr501) are difficult to adjust to the given en-
vironment (we used peephole boxes to reduce the detection angle of the
sensor).
Instead, as soon as a person starts moving around the room, multiple
sensors are triggered, often irrespective of the distance between the user
and the sensor. Thus, we perform a joint analysis combining the data
from different infrared sensors. We discover that a repeatable sensor
activation pattern emerges that could be classified into one of three
different user behaviour classes – no movement, seating and walking –
and we use the discovered patterns as the values for a high-level feature
we construct.
4. We observe variation in the calculated features’ values depending on
the segmentation interval. In order to determine its optimal value, we
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calculate all the features at the following time-segment values: s = [1s,
2s, 4s, 8s, 16s, 32s, 64s, 128s].
5.3 Preliminary Analysis of Dataset Informa-
tiveness
Is the feature space we engineered in Section 5.2 informative enough to allow
discrimination among our test users? To answer this question we apply the
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) algorithm [36] to different data subsets
and extract the two most prominent components of the results. LDA is
a popular dimensionality reduction and less-popular classification technique
that models the difference between the given classes of data. We experiment
with a different number of random participants and also data segmented at
different interval lengths, and examine the clustering of LDA-processed data
points belonging to different users. The emergence of clear cluster borders
among data points from different users in the LDA space would indicate that
our features are indeed informative enough and could serve as a basis for user
identification.
We plot the first two components of the LDA (Figure 5.1) for different
number of users at time segment length that yields the highest Calinski-
Harabasz index [51] score for the selected user subset. We observe that
with a growing number of participants, the highest score is achieved with
longer segmentation intervals, as one might expect. Furthermore with a
growing number of users, the separability of individual clusters gradually
decreases. Consequently, and in line with the conclusions of the meta-study
of authentication mechanisms by Sugrim et al. [38], we expect the accuracy
of our user authentication mechanism to drop with a rising number of users.
Figure 5.1 (top row) depicts data points taken from a single task run
of a group of users, with a time segment interval of 64 seconds. To assess
the invariability of the sensed behaviour in the bottom row of the figure
we plot the LDA points of both runs of the same groups as above. We
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observe that points of the same colour (corresponding to the same user) do
not necessarily form a coherent cluster, indicating that the behaviour need
not be stable over multiple repetitions of the same task. Moreover, LDA
points calculated from data gathered during a subsequent run executed by
the same user are often closer to another user’s LDA points then to the
LDA points of the initial task run of the original user. Projecting the data
in higher dimensions and using advanced machine learning algorithms may
help with carving a unique space for each user that would then ensure more
robust identification. Nevertheless, we believe that significant volatility of
user behaviour, evident from the above plots, precludes the “static” approach
where a classifier is trained on data recorded in a single session. Instead,
we advocate for an approach where the identification method is constantly
updated with the most recent user behaviour data. The two identification
approaches – “static” and “continuous” – are developed and evaluated in
Chapters 6 and 7, respectively.
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Figure 5.1: Clustering in 2-dimensional LDA space for 3, 7 and 11 different
users. Each colour represents data describing the behaviour of a single user
during Task 3. The top row only takes into account data from the first
task run, while the bottom row takes both. We observe a clear separation
between users when only taking data from a single run, while inducing data
of multiple runs per user introduces much higher rate of inter-class blending.
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Chapter 6
Classification
In this section we examine identity verification that is based solely on data
sensed by IoT sensors. Despite a wealth of approaches that rely on very
diverse data, from those pertaining to driving behaviour to those related to
typing styles, behaviour biometrics solutions are generally considered to be
of insufficient explanatory power to provide a sound basis for user identifi-
cation [4]. Thus, our goal in this work is not only to provide a standalone
solution for user authentication, but also to evaluate the potential of non-
sensitive data collected in IoT environments for modelling individual user
behaviour and providing support to orthogonal user authentication mecha-
nisms.
We base our analysis on the collected dataset described in Chapter 5.
Our dataset consists of data sensed while each of the users performed each
of the three tasks two times. To avoid overfitting, we take the collection of
the first runs of each task type and use the aggregated data as a training set;
similarly we use the aggregated second runs of each task type as a testing
set. Individual data instances consist of features calculated on data collected
during a continuous time segment during a task run.
On the average, the first runs of the tasks were slightly longer, thus we
obtain a 57%-43% split of the number of instances between the training and
test set per each task type. Each of the three task types is handled separately,
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so we generate three separate training and test sets.
We construct a machine learning (ML) pipeline where we train an ML
model with the training data and evaluate its accuracy of user identification
on the test data. As explained above, the training and the test data are never
from the same task session. To further assess the informativeness of such an
approach we examine the role of data segmentation, feature selection, and
user count on the classification result:
• The feature space we use consists of 229 dimensions (engineered fea-
tures) which we aim to reduce in order to discover the most informative
features and sensors. Therefore, whenever we construct a classifier, we
apply a univariate feature selection algorithm, utilising the mutual in-
formation [37] scoring function. We take the ten most informative
features every time, as we found that this yields the best results in
terms of the classification accuracy.
• After a thorough analysis of the impact of time segments on the clas-
sification accuracy (elaborated in Section 6.2) we set on using eight-
second time segments throughout Chapter 6, unless stated otherwise.
The reason for such choice is the ratio between accuracy and compu-
tational time that eight-second time segments provide. Furthermore,
using longer time segments would introduce potentially intolerable de-
lay in the identification process.
• The success of user identification approaches is often highly dependent
on the number of users on which the approach is tested [38]. To as-
sess the scalability of our solution, we examine its performance with a
varying number of users. Each time we take a random sample of users
from the complete dataset, repeat the process until we exhaust all user
combinations, and state the average, the best, and the worst result.
In the rest of the section we first pinpoint the most promising classifi-
cation method (Section 6.1), then examine how the ability to authenticate
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users with the collected IoT data varies with the number of users and the
length of data segments (Section 6.2), continue with the identification of the
most informative features and sensors (Section 6.3), and finally, inspect the
classification confidence levels (Section 6.4).
6.1 Comparison of Machine Learning Algo-
rithms
We face a classification problem, as our target classes are the user labels
linked to our experiment participants. The highest possible identification
accuracy is our primary goal, therefore we focus on ensemble algorithms
such as Random Forest and AdaBoost that often outperform simpler alter-
natives when it comes to user identification. However, as we are examin-
ing sensor-based identification in smart environments we are also interested
in lightweight algorithms, such as Linear Discriminant Analysis, k-Nearest
Neighbours, and Naive Bayesian, that can run on resource-constrained plat-
forms. To summarize, we experiment with the following algorithms and their
settings:
• k-Nearest Neighbours (kNN) with the k value set to 5.
• Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) with the number of compo-
nents set to 2.
• Naive Bayesian with Laplace smoothing.
• Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) with 1000 estimators and a deci-
sion tree set as a base estimator.




The above classifiers’ hyper-parameter values were found through a ran-
dom search in the hyper-parameter space of each classifier type. Performing
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a random search, we first define the relevant hyper-parameters of each classi-
fier, keeping in mind the dataset we have at hand, and then determine their
value ranges based on the premise that the computational time must remain
within a one second threshold. The initial hyper-parameter space is large, so
we decide to perform multiple iterations of this random search. Within each
iteration the algorithm takes different random value sets of hyper-parameters
and performs user identification, providing classification accuracy as the out-
put and ranks the hyper-parameter sets based on the achieved classification
accuracy. After each iteration we prune the parameter value ranges towards
the best scoring ones in order to avoid searching in the unpromising parts of
said value ranges. The initial idea was to finish it off with an additional grid
search step, but it proved redundant as it did not provide any performance
benefits, while being time and resource consuming.
For the scope of our evaluation, we separately take each task of the
already-split data of all users (17, 20, and 18 users for each of the three
task types, respectively). We then apply feature selection to the training
dataset and take the ten best-performing features. Finally, we classify the
testing set using each of the classifiers mentioned above. Observing the re-
sults presented in Figure 6.1, Random Forest is on average the highest scoring
classifier with 68% accuracy for Task 1, 50% for Task 2, and 63% for Task
3, followed closely by AdaBoost with 3% lower mean classification accuracy,
trailing in the first task by 12.8%, but leading by 3.7% and 1.1% in the
second and the third task respectively. Next is LDA which is on average per-
forming 9.4% worse than AdaBoost. Naive Bayes and kNN algorithms also
outperform the baseline of the majority classifier, but cannot compete with
other algorithms we evaluated. To examine the robustness of the approach,
we apply the same classification pipeline while randomising which task run
of a user is included in the training and the testing set (initially, we trained
on the first runs, tested on the second runs). The results remain stable and
do not change in any significant manner.
Both ensemble learning methods, Random Forest and AdaBoost, perform
























Figure 6.1: Comparison of user identification accuracy between different
machine learning algorithms and the baseline majority classifier (MC). The
accuracy is calculated on per task basis.
better than other ML approaches we experimented with. The superior per-
formance of these two compared to other algorithms we tested might stem
from a large number of heterogeneous features we have at the input, since
ensemble algorithms implicitly perform further feature selection during the
model construction. Comparing the two, Random Forest clearly dominates
in Task 1, whereas the approaches appear to be somewhat tied for the other
two tasks. Thus, in the rest of the paper we focus on this method.
6.2 Number of Users & Time Segment Inter-
vals
It should be mentioned that the choice of the ML classifier is not the only
parameter we have to consider while devising a continuous authentication
system. Two other important parameters we have to scrutinize are (a) the
number of legitimate users that will use the system, and (b) the time segment
interval used in data aggregation.
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The number of legitimate users of the system is directly connected to
the level of the performance we can expect from the proposed system when
discerning between different users. By choosing to include a larger number of
legitimate users in a system, we introduce a larger number of target classes
for the classifier to choose from and also increase the probability of inducing
two or more users with similar behaviour patterns that may further hinder
the classification accuracy of our classifier.
Aggregating more data into a single data row of the data set has a po-
tential two-fold effect on the accuracy of the identification. By taking larger
chunks of data, we potentially overgeneralise the data and lose information
nuances that are only present in shorter time periods. In addition to this, in
a real-life application it also takes a longer time for the system to be able to
identify the user for the first time. On the other hand, taking time segment
intervals that are too fine can have an opposite effect in the sense that we
miss information about the bigger picture that can only be obtained by using
longer time segment intervals.
In order to test these two parameters, we define a set of different num-
bers of users N = {3, 7, 11, 15} and a set of different time segment intervals
S = {1s, 4s, 8s, 32s, 128s}. As taking only one user subset would likely lead
to biased results, as the users differ among themselves with regards to iden-
tifiability, we take the Cartesian product of sets N and S. For each pair we
perform 500 iterations for each of the three tasks, taking n ∈ N random users
at each iteration and utilising the ML pipeline, described in the introduction
of this section, but limiting ourselves to the Random Forest classifier only.
Figure 6.2 depicts the average classification accuracy of the three tasks
achieved by taking pairs of different numbers of users and time segment
intervals, as described above. Observing the classifiers’ performance with
different number of users we see a clear trend confirming our assumption that
introducing more users has a negative effect on the classification accuracy of
the classifier. Furthermore we observe that the drop in accuracy lessens with
the rising number of users, as well as with the rising time segment interval.

























Figure 6.2: Comparison of the classification accuracy for different num-
ber of users and different time segment intervals, using the Random Forest
Classifier. The error bars display the standard deviation of accuracy, due to
the fact that we performed 500 iterations with every parameter combination,
taking random users in each iteration.
This may indicate relative scalability of the approach, albeit this should be
confirmed with data collected from a larger pool of users.
Differences in accuracy regarding time segment intervals are much less
prominent. Still, we can recognise the 32 second segments as the best per-
forming in terms of the classification accuracy. Even though, having in mind
only minor accuracy differences, shorter time segments would be a more
preferable choice – identifying the user after more than half a minute and
then having to wait for another half a minute for each consecutive identifi-
cation could be prohibitively long for certain real-life application. In light
of this observation, we will use eight-second time segment intervals for the
remainder of this section.






































































































































Figure 6.3: Information gain of features with an amount higher than 1%
of total entropy for each of the three tasks.
6.3 Sensor and Feature Informativeness
Understanding which engineered features and consequently which sensors
are the most informative is essential for guiding future work on IoT-based
authentication systems. Furthermore, it would also help us better understand
which user traits are the most distinguishable and could potentially also
indicate how sensors should be placed in a smart environment in order to
achieve the highest user authentication accuracy.
To assess the feature informativeness, we use the Information Gain (IG)
as it is commonly used in feature selection and informativeness calculation
[39, 40]. Different tasks require different routines and user behaviour, so we
calculate IG on a per-task basis in order to detect the discrepancies in the
amount of information each feature provides. In Figure 6.3 we plot the IG
of features that surpassed the 1% mark of the total entropy.
The feature acronyms noted on the X-axis follow a simple key. The first
character denotes the sensor, the second (optional) character denotes the
axis (or no character which represent joined axes or none) and the two or
three characters after the underscore denote the feature calculated from the
denoted sensor/signal (me – mean, max – maximum, sd – standard deviation,
mcr – mean crossing rate). We observe that the mean value is by far the most
informative feature, as it takes twenty six out of thirty places on the three
plotted figures and it is the exclusively plotted feature of the third task, which
is in line with some of the relevant related work [18, 32]. The remaining three
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features which seem relevant are the maximum and the mean crossing rate in
the first, and the standard deviation in the second task. Interestingly, none
of the frequency domain features were selected in any of the task classifiers.
The prevalence of the mean, especially with the accelerometer, gyroscope,
and force sensor data, is interesting, as it implies that certain care should
be taken when selecting the ranges in which these sensors operate. While
we normalised the data beforehand, thus ensured that the findings are not
over-fit to the given equipment, we note that sensors of drastically different
sensing ranges might provide over- or under- saturated readings limiting the
discernibility among the behaviours.
Sensor-wise, the accelerometer, the gyroscope and the force sensors are
prevailing. They account for the 90% of the amount of features with a higher
than 1% total entropy. Concomitant to those, we observe some showings
of the memory and network usage. The accelerometer values (ax me and
ay me) correspond to 2D horizontal acceleration, while the vertical movement
proves much less prominent. These values correspond to users’ typing force.
The gyroscopes’ (gx me, gz me and gz sd) reflect small movements of the
keyboard, induced either by user typing or an actual readjustment of the
keyboard by the user. Signals from the force sensors correspond to users’
stance while working on the computer with the fa me, fb me, fc me, fd me,
fd sd and fd mcr representing the top-left, bottom-left, bottom-right, and
top-right corner of the force plate respectively. Meanwhile the maximum
and mean value of memory usage and mean value of received network packets
(m max, m me and nr sd) represent the PC usage behaviour patterns of the
user, such as the kind and the amount of the programs opened and used at
any given time. There are no prominent PC monitor features present in the
third task and, contrary to our expectations, PIR-related features are not
present either.
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6.4 Confidence Levels
Belonging to the ensemble family of the machine learning algorithms, Ran-
dom Forest can also provide per class probabilities of every test case by
calculating the mean predicted class probabilities, where the class probabil-
ity of a single tree is fraction of samples of the class in a leaf. Using this
calculation we formulate two metrics which we deem helpful while construct-
ing the continuous authentication system – true and false confidence level.
True confidence level is the average probability of the predicted user class of
the test cases when the user was predicted correctly and complementary the
false confidence level is the average probability of the predicted user class of
the test cases when the predicted and true user class mismatch. These two
metrics can be calculated on a user, as well as on a population level.
At this point we analyse the average true and false confidence level of
the whole user population for the three tasks. We observe a 15.7% disparity
between the true and false confidence level, consequently demonstrating that
our algorithm is on average 15.7% more confident that it predicted the true
user when indeed it predicted the true user, than in cases when it predicted
a wrong one. With this knowledge we can devise a continuous authentication
system based on the premise that the higher the confidence level of any new
predicted data, the higher the chance that the user the algorithm predicted is
actually the person she is claiming to be. Based on the consistency of the both
levels throughout the tasks one may even suggest that we can analytically
define the threshold and, based on the confidence level, tell if the algorithm
made a mistake predicting a certain user. The per task confidence levels
disparity is displayed in Figure 6.4.




























Figure 6.4: Per task true and false confidence levels when classifying users.
The error bars represent the standard deviation of the confidence levels.
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Chapter 7
Continuous Authentication
The context of the users’ actions changes even over the course of a single
session. For example, in our experiments every user starts by entering the
room, walking to the workstation, at which point she may do some additional
movement around the room, type on the keyboard or browse the Internet,
and so on. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, such a constant change of context
makes it difficult to identify and authenticate a user from the data aggregated
over the whole session. Nevertheless, the collected IoT sensor data can be
used for continuous authentication of an already authenticated user. In this
section we propose a time-sequence based approach to continuous authenti-
cation where a user’s behaviour is monitored as the task plays out in the IoT
environment and assess the suitability of this approach for ensuring that the
originally authenticated user is indeed the one performing the task. Unlike
the classification method developed in Chapter 6, the method presented in
this section does not require a classifier to be constructed on the previous
task runs. Instead, the approach examines whether the currently sensed data
is in line with a recently observed human behaviour pattern and as such, in
the limit case, can even be task-oblivious.
In this section, we construct a one-vs-all classifier enabling continuous
authentication of a legitimate user. Rather than taking the initial task runs
for training and the remaining runs for testing, we simultaneously traverse,
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one step at a time, over task runs coming from multiple users. At point τ
in time we take the past data of the sessions and use them as a training
set. The previously identified best performing classifier, Random Forest (see
Chapter 6), is trained upon these data. We then assume that one session
was authenticated by a robust one-off authentication method (a password)
in the past and we then use the above classifier to infer whether the currently
sensed data belongs to the initially authenticated user. Our decision to train
the classifier on data coming from “parallel” sessions is a convenience that
helps us ensure a balanced dataset. The data need not be collected at the
same time for all the users, the only requirement is that the data correspond
to different users performing the same task. However, the fact that the data
can be processed in real time and in parallel for multiple users opens up
interesting application domains, such as providing a CA mechanisms for a
larger factory hall where a number of operators perform the same tasks in
the same shift.
In our evaluation we move through the data one second at the time (con-
trary to the eight second time segments used in Chapter 6) and calculate
the per-user probability distribution on the last second of the sensing data,
as defined in Section 7.3. While iterating through the time steps, the train-
ing set grows and with the changing contexts we want to limit the amount
of data taken into account in each iteration. Therefore we introduce a n-
lookback time window, which only takes n last time steps of the data, in-
stead of the whole available data from the beginning of each run, where
n = [10, 25, 50, 100].
7.1 Threat Model
But what are the security threats we are even trying to mitigate? To answer
that we first define the threat model we are fighting against in this chapter.
Nowadays, static authentication mechanism require end-users to identify
themselves when first signing up for a service and then such mechanisms
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assume that the same end-user is active up until she explicitly signs outs [52].
In our system this is achievable by either and RFID card or a password.
While this procedure is end-user friendly and reduces the burden of repeating
authentication efforts on behalf of end-users, it nonetheless demotes system
security. This is because malicious applications and adversaries can gain
access to a system where a legitimate end-user has already authenticated
or after the initial sign on and subsequently perform specific attacks (e.g.,
masquerading).
We believe that CA, where a user’s behaviour represents a basis for on-
going re-evaluation of the users’ identity, mitigates the above issues and per-
fectly complements static forms of authentication (including password-based
and multi-factor authentication). Our goal is, thus, to use the above ap-
proach to alleviate the following threat:
A malicious agent takes over a pre-authenticated session from a
legitimate user;
We assume that the above attack is happening in a smart environment
hosting a range of sensors, and it is exactly the reflection of a user’s behaviour
provided by these sensors that we use as a foundation of our machine learning
(ML) based CA approach. So the work at hand studies to what extent ML
can be used for user authentication and can enforce additional authentication
mechanism whenever mis-behaviour is identified in a smart environment. We
do not study whether a ML classifier may resist to targeted attacks, i.e. where
a malicious agent has the ability to observe and mimic the legitimate user.
Instead, we leave such considerations for future work.
7.2 Lookback Window Length
Without a definitive knowledge on how often the context changes, we need
to explore different lookback window sizes to capture the data pertaining to
the currently relevant context and minimise the impact of previously active
context on the identification accuracy. We take all users’ runs (first or second)































Figure 7.1: Classification accuracy of user identification using parallel user
data for different lookback windows (10s, 25s, 50s and 100s). The analysis is
performed on per-task basis.
of a given task and perform user classification of every time step along the
way, using previous n seconds of the data as the training set1.
Results presented in Figure 7.1 indicate that there are no significant dif-
ferences in classification accuracy when different lookback window sizes are
used. Overall, the achieved accuracy is very high, ranging from 97.3% in Task
1 with the window size set to 100 seconds, up to 99.3% in Task 3 with the
same window size. With marginal differences achieved by varying the look-
back window size, we propose taking only the previous ten steps of the data,
as taking a larger lookback window leads to a longer computational time
without any clear classification accuracy benefits. Furthermore, our investi-
gation shows that taking a ten-second lookback window remains sufficient for
real-time retraining and re-executing the model within the one-second time
step, hence enabling the final authenticator to authenticate the user once
every second.
1It should be noted that we focus on a task-level classification, thus we do not attempt
to re-align time sequences from different users, a larger variety of task execution speed
will lead to a larger dissimilarity among users in the training set.


























Figure 7.2: Per user confidence levels for true (current user) and false
(another user) class. Error bars represent the standard deviation of the
confidence levels.
7.3 Continuous Authentication Confidence Lev-
els
The above analysis confirms that an individual’s within a task behaviour is
consistent and that our IoT sensing-based method provides a reliable tool
for continuous authentication of a previously identified user. But can we
augment it with the ability to detect a session takeover by an illegitimate
user? To provide a basis for such a detection and to further improve the
performance of CA, similarly to the approach taken in Section 6.4 we harness
the discrepancy between the classification confidence levels when either the
true or the false class is predicted.
We calculate the confidence level as the mean predicted class probabili-
ties, where the class probability of a single tree is fraction of samples of the
class in a leaf, as we did in Section 6.4. A simplified, but less time demanding
version of the quantile regression forests [53], that can be calculated within
our desirable time to authenticate. This class can either be true, correspond
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to the actual user, or false, correspond to a different user. In Figure 7.2 we
plot the mean confidence levels of all tasks for each user when either the true
or the false class was predicted, with the error bars representing standard
deviation. Comparing to the confidence levels achieved during the stan-
dalone identification (Section 6.4), we observe even more striking differences
between true and false confidence levels. With an average true confidence
level at 86.9% and an average false confidence level at 35.2%, and with a fair
amount of consistency between users, we hypothesise that taking the confi-
dence level into account when deciding on user authentication we would be
able to construct a robust task run takeover detector.
7.4 Session Takeover Detection
Our ultimate goal is to devise a system that continuously confirms the iden-
tity of the intended user and reliably and rapidly detects a potential security
breach. The breach model we are focused on is relevant for a number of shared
spaces, such as those found in hospitals, factory control rooms, or reception
desks. A breach may occur after a legitimate user authenticates herself us-
ing a standard means of authentication, but fails to properly de-authenticate
before leaving the monitored environment. This presents an opportunity for
a malicious user to access the system impersonating a legitimate user. The
details of the threat model are presented in Section 7.1.
Using the data of both runs of Task 12 in the collected dataset we emulate
the session takeover attack and develop a detection mechanism that relies
on our continuous authentication method and classifier confidence metric.
Taking all different pairs of participants, we designate one as the victim
and the other as the attacker and vice-versa. All remaining participants are
treated as other legitimate users of the system. We then combine the first
half of the task run data of the victim and the second half of the task run data
of the attacker and merge them into a single “user”, simulating a security
2First task runs as the threshold training and the second ones as the validation.
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breach, roughly halfway into the task run. In summary the dataset that
we use is a merger of the victim-attacker data and other participants’ data,
of course the original (non-modified) victims’ and the attackers’ task runs
are not present in this dataset. The data from time segments that display
a low enough confidence, based on the given threshold, is discarded and
does not become the part of future random forest models. We include this
mechanism to combat idle times and abrupt (but only momentary) behaviour
discrepancies.
Our detection method is based on the approach explained in the intro-
duction of this section and relies on the n-lookback window analysis from
Section 7.2 and the confidence level analysis from Section 7.3. We expect
that in the moment of the attack the first second of data originating from a
malicious user, the confidence level will fall significantly and stay low as we
already established that there is a significant discrepancy between the con-
fidence level of the classifier when the true and the false class is predicted.
From the preliminary analysis (Figure 7.2), it follows that the confidence
level of the false class rarely goes above certain values. Therefore, we base
our approach on appropriate thresholding of the classification confidence. To
fine-tune the confidence level threshold, which serves as a segregation line
between a legitimate and a malicious user, we use the first task runs of the
users to determine the threshold value (in a sense “threshold training”). We
experiment with values between 0.45 and 0.7 in 0.00625-wide steps. After
setting the threshold, we use the second task runs to obtain the final results
as per the previously described methodology.
We evaluate our approach along four relevant metrics, which have been
used in the related work before [54]. The False Rejection Rate (FRR) [55]
represents the number of false negatives (a legitimate user considered ma-
licious), compared to the number of all legitimate user checks. The False
Acceptance Rate (FAR) represents the number of false positives (a malicious
user considered legitimate), compared to the number of all malicious user
checks. As there is a trade-off between these two metrics, we also use the























Figure 7.3: False rejection and false acceptance rate for a given lookback
and confidence level threshold values. Lines of the same colour (type) present
the same lookback value with the ascending lines displaying the FRR and
the descending the FAR values, respectively.
Equal Error Rate (EER) in order to provide a one-off metric that is compa-
rable to related work. For numerous practical purposes, however, the most
important issue is how reliably and how soon is a malicious user logged out
of the system once an intrusion is detected? This can be gauged from the
balance between the FRR and the fourth relevant metric we calculate – the
time delay between the attack beginning and its detection.
We plot the FRR and FAR metrics for different lookback windows lengths
and different confidence level thresholds in Figure 7.3. We observe an in-
crease in FRR and a decline in FAR values with the increasing confidence
level threshold. This is expected as more and more examples are classified as
non-legitimate with a higher threshold values. The lowest achieved EER is
with a lookback value of 20 and a threshold of 0.58 at 7.9%, followed closely
by lookback values of 40 and 10 with and EER of 8.3% (threshold 0.6) and
8.5% (threshold 0.57). The smallest lookback value of 5 is trailing behind
with an EER of 10.1% (threshold 0.56). Furthermore we plot the attack
detection delay in Figure 7.4. Observing the different lookback values we are






























Figure 7.4: Average time delay (in seconds) between the start of the attack
and the attack detection for different lookback windows and confidence level
thresholds.
able to conclude that at a given confidence level threshold a higher lookback
value exhibits a longer delay. This is as expected due to the greater momen-
tum (number of past values of legitimate users we still take into account)
of a higher lookback value. With an increasing threshold those differences
diminish and the overall detection delay is shortened.
Concentrating on the end result, the general trend in the data points out
that the increase in the lookback window length leads to a higher detection
latency, but brings a lower FRR. The increased accuracy of the system with
a longer lookback window might stem from the noisy nature of sensor mea-
surements and occasional “glitches” in user behaviour; the impact of both of
these effects is minimised if the data is averaged over a longer time window.
From the practical point of view, the choice of the confidence level threshold
should be dependent on the context of the system usage. If reliable operation
is crucial, taking a longer lookback window allows setting a threshold that
keeps the FRR virtually at zero. In such a case, our approach needs about
fifty seconds to detect an intruder. On the contrary, in delicate environments,
where security is of utmost importance, a 5-second lookback window and 0.35
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confidence level threshold would successfully detect an intruder after only ten
seconds, with the FRR remaining below 1%.
Finally, we apply both of the proposed parameter pairs (the lookback
window of 40 and 5 seconds, with the confidence level threshold of 0.375
and 0.35, respectively) to the second task runs of Task 1. With the longer
lookback window and the higher threshold we achieve a FRR of 0.2% with
an intrusion detection delay of 44 seconds. The second parameter pair yields
a FRR of 1% while detecting the intrusion after only 12 seconds. The similar
results to those achieved during the analysis of the first run (above), indicates
that the selected parameter values generalise over different task runs.
Chapter 8
Discussion
This thesis provides an alternative to a common assumption that authenti-
cation has to rely on sensitive data, such as biometrics, or that it requires
access to a users’ personal device, such as a smartphone [26]. Other solutions
that harness the environment for authentication rely either on network traffic
analysis [32], which limits their applicability to situations in which a user is
actively using the network, or on wireless signal analysis [41], which is limited
to detecting a users’ physical activity. Our work, on the other hand, uses
multimodal non-sensitive data sensing – we investigate the informativeness
of accelerometer, gyroscope, force sensor, PC usage indicators, PIR, and hall
sensor sampling. Our analysis reveals that the “closer” the sensor is to the
object of interaction (a keyboard), the more discriminative the sampled data
is for authentication. Thus, in our testbed, sensors placed on the desktop,
such as the accelerometer, gyroscope, and force sensors alone are sufficient
for models with above 60% identification accuracy. The key issue limiting
the discriminating power of IoT-sensed data for the purpose of user identifi-
cation is the volatility of human behaviour. We observe that the same user
sometimes performs the same task in a drastically different manner, render-
ing identification approaches that rely on modelling upon the historically
collected data unusable. Yet, a deeper analysis of the collected data reveals
that intrinsic short-term behavioural patterns get captured by IoT-sensed
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data. Consequently, in our work we develop an online-updateable continu-
ous authentication method that reliably confirms the identity of a previously
authenticated user.
8.1 Performance evaluation and comparison
to other approaches
A direct comparison between the method presented in this paper and the ex-
isting approaches for behaviour-based authentication is not straightforward
due to the difference in the utilised datasets, including the number of users,
the length of the experiments, and the modalities of the collected sensor
data, but also due to the applications for which the proposed methods were
envisioned. Unlike most of the related work, our authentication system is
tailored to shared devices rather than personal devices – the continuous au-
thentication mechanism we present in this paper does not require a specific
device, nor a specific device type, to be carried by a user. Nevertheless, in
order to identify the most promising avenues for future work, in the remain-
der of this subsection we compare the standard evaluation metrics, such as
EER, FAR, and FRR of different approaches.
The approach based on keystroke and mouse dynamics presented in [12]
achieves an identification accuracy rate of 62.2% in a multi-modal scenario,
albeit only based on two data sources. In our analysis of standalone iden-
tification based on IoT sensor data presented in Chapter 6 we obtain 68%
accuracy. We believe that additional modalities, such as force sensors placed
on the desk, lead to this improvement. Another approach based exclusively
on keystroke dynamics [9] achieves better results, with a FRR of 4% and a
FAR of less than 0.01%. Our best FAR rate reaches 1.8% with the FRR
of 49%. Nevertheless, the results must be considered in the light of quite a
substantial privacy trade-off, as the authentication system presented in [9]
requires access to the typing data of the users. This is a privacy implication
that is unlikely to be acceptable in shared environments considered in our
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work.
Feng et al. [56] add a new dimension to keystroke authentication by also
considering touch pressure as well, achieving EER of less than 10%, 20% or
5% depending on the classifier used. Our best EER of less than 8% makes our
system comparable to this approach. Methods based on pure touch dynamics,
such as [22], provide the best overall performance, with an achieved EER
of 4%. This is perhaps expected, as touch screen interactions can be very
sophisticated. Intuitively, the closer an authentication layer is related to
the physical movement of the user, the more distinctive the authentication
seems to be. However, the study was run on smartphones rather than on
shared devices. It is unclear whether users would interact differently with
a device they are less used to (e.g. a shared public terminal). It is also
possible that, while touch screen interactions offer high levels of distinctness
in the way users interact with the screen, different screen sizes and different,
perhaps shorter, interactions would reduce the amount of freedom allowed
to the user, potentially making different users look more similar in the eyes
of the classifier. Nevertheless, touchscreen interaction, and gesture analysis
in general, present a promising avenue for future research in the area of
IoT-based authentication.
8.2 Implications for IoT environments
Smart environments are often denounced as insecure [57]. In this paper
we demonstrate that IoT sensing can actually be used to boost the overall
security. The same sensors that would in any case be installed for other
purposes (e.g. PIR sensors for controlling lights, hall sensors for detecting
inventory changes) can actually be used for security enhancement. Further,
in the presented work we demonstrate that the quality of inference increases
with additional sensors. This has also been discussed in a recent survey of
continuous authentication approaches, which concludes with the authors’ call
for multimodal sensing solutions [4]. The ramification could be an increased
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diversity of sensors in future smart spaces. In case the sensors are not already
present, the environment can be equipped with IoT devices whose exclusive
purpose is to provide support for continuous authentication. Naturally, such
a setup incurs an additional cost. Yet, the commodification of IoT devices
makes this cost rather low – the full setup we used in Section ?? costs less
than $200 USD. The setup costs can be further reduced, if the software that
we aim to release, and that we used in our experiments, can be applied to
the environment at hand.
The multimodality of our approach also allows our system to be more
resilient against mimicry attacks. While in a mono-modal continuous au-
thentication system (be it keystroke-, touch-, or more in general biometrics-
based) an attacker only needs to learn patterns of behaviour related to a
well-defined subset of attributes (which can be more or less easy to repli-
cate), in a multimodal system, such as the one presented in this thesis, an
attacker would have to replicate different sets of attributes in order to suc-
cessfully perform a mimicry-based attack. The usage of different categories
of attributes at the same point in time adds complexity to any adversarial ap-
proach based on the mirroring of user behaviour, both from a computational
perspective in the case of devices built to break authentication systems, and
from a training perspective in the additional effort to train adversaries to
learn multi-dimensional patterns of behaviour [58, 59].
The approach presented in this thesis can also have a tangible impact on
human-computer interaction (HCI). One of the key HCI issues with authen-
tication is frequent authentication prompts [2]. In the future we envision
a system that optimises the amount of prompting by tracking a user’s be-
haviour in an IoT environment and re-authenticating a user only at times
when the CA mechanism’s confidence drops below a certain threshold. The
issue of when to actually prompt a user for re-authentication is a complex one
and should take into account not only the reliability of different authentica-
tion mechanisms, but also the security needs, as well as a users’ availability
for impromptu interaction [60].
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We believe that our work, together with the publicly-released dataset,
represents a starting point for future efforts on heterogeneous authentication
approaches that merge IoT-sensed data, data sensed via personal devices (a
user’s smartwatch), and dedicated authentication mechanisms (fingerprint
readers, passwords). Furthermore, the our approach can be expanded to
include novel wireless sensors, such as Google Soli, that enable micro ges-
ture recognition even without physical placement of a sensor on the object,
and represent a promising platform for unobtrusive non-sensitive data sens-
ing [61]. Together, these sources define an intriguing yet-to-be-charted re-
search space. Finally, we believe that our work provides ground for other
efforts relying on IoT data for different purposes, such as for service person-
alisation.
8.3 Generalisability of our approach
Guided by the exploration of the boundaries of sensor-based identification
in this work we focused on experimentation with tasks that are rather well
specified. Such tasks minimise the discrepancy among individuals that may
arise due to one’s “own way” of performing a task and ensure a higher gen-
eralisability of the tested methods. While a looser task specification would
likely incur a higher identification accuracy, our results demonstrate that
sensor-based authentication could also be beneficial in more rigid environ-
ments, such as factories, where tasks might indeed be rather well defined.
The level of detail in the task definition also has consequences on the perfor-
mance of the CA method developed in Chapter 7: training on data collected
in well defined scenarios would ensure that the classifier is built on the in-
trinsic behavioural traits, rather than task execution deviations, and would
therefore make it more difficult for an adversary to pose as a legitimate user
even if the users can be observed.
The generalisability of the identification method developed in Chapter 6
is indeed limited by the available task-specific data. The classifiers considered
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therein require sensor data collected when the participants are performing
a certain predefined task. Should users be instructed to perform a different
task at the testing time, the classification would fail. However, the continuous
authentication approach developed in Chapter 7 retrains a classifier at each
time step leading to two important generalisability consequences. First, the
variations that, as shown in Chapter 6, occur between subsequent task runs
conducted by the same user do not impact the classification performance,
since the model adapts to the current task run. Second, in the limit case
where multiple users enact the same task in parallel the approach can be
task oblivious, adapting in real time to any task exciting the given sensors
in an environment.
In our future work we plan to explore the limits of cross-task generalis-
ability of IoT sensor-based identification. Our first step in this direction will
be a construction of an adversarial deep learning pipeline that automates fea-
ture extraction so that the generated features provide a good basis for user
identification, yet render the task identification impossible (similarly to [62]).
In the initial study we focused on a single smart office environment. Nev-
ertheless, the concepts we developed apply to other environments equipped
with similar sensors. Therefore, we envision our approach being used in smart
homes, for example, where smart speakers, currently relying on a user’s voice
only, could harness multimodal IoT environment sensing for improved secu-
rity. Shared public spaces, such as libraries, could also benefit from the CA
approach developed in this paper, as terminals would recognise that a user
has not logged out, thus prevent misuse. In Chapter 6 we achieve relatively
modest user identification rates, yet, tuned to err on the safe side, the ap-
proach could be used for augmenting other surveillance mechanisms. For
instance, a surveillance camera could be triggered only when a previously
unknown movement/user is detected, therefore reducing the amount of irrel-
evant content recorded. Finally, while the initial analysis focuses on a lone
user in the space, we believe that the continuous authentication approach
can simply be extended to recognise, even track, multiple persons in the
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same room. The LDA analysis from Figure 5.1 demonstrates that individual
behaviour within a single task run remains consistent and easily separable
even in a low-dimensional space.
8.4 Limitations
The findings of our study should be considered in the light of the limita-
tions of the acquired dataset. Our experiments were conducted with a rela-
tively modest number of users – we have experimented with data originating
from between 17 and 20 users, depending on the task type. In the related
work datasets involving twice as many and more users can be found. How-
ever, these approaches aim to authenticate users from brief interactions (e.g.
touchscreen gestures, typing short text). Feature spaces emerging from such
interactions are narrow. The tasks conducted by our subjects, despite being
well defined, are relatively long and complex. The resulting multimodal fea-
ture space is broad allowing for differences among users to naturally emerge.
Therefore, the performance degradation with an increasing number of users,
although probable, is unlikely to be as drastic as it would be if we were to
rely on short monomodal tasks. This is hinted in Figure 6.2, yet we have
already prepared a new testbed in the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the
European Commission in Ispra, Italy, with over 2,000 employees where we
plan to thoroughly evaluate our approach with a larger number of users and
with additional tasks of different duration. Finally, we should note that the
relative homogeneity of our users is not a limitation, but an advantage of our
dataset, as it makes the authentication process more difficult.
Relying on a novel authentication method may introduce overlooked se-
curity issues. As IoT-based authentication support becomes more prominent
we might expect new attacks that would render it less useful. Such attacks
targeting different sensing modalities might include viruses that would gen-
erate CPU and network activity that mimic usage patterns generated by a
legitimate user; similarly, an adversary with a physical access to the environ-
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ment could place motors producing vibrations similar to the ones produced
by a legitimate user typing. Preventing such attacks requires further con-
sideration of an IoT system cyber- and physical- security. Having in mind
the results of user identification in Chapter 6 we argue against using our
proposed IoT-based sensing mechanism as a standalone solution for authen-
tication. Instead, we propose using it to continuously assess the identity of
a user that has previously been authenticated through a conventional means
of authentication. This ensures that, in the worst case, even if all the sensors
are compromised, the barrier for a successful attack remains at the same
level as with a single traditional authentication mechanism, whereas in the
case the system functions as expected it makes the attack drastically more
challenging to realise.
8.5 Future Work
Personal computers brought many benefits to the modern society and im-
proved our personal and professional life in many ways. As no technology
is perfect, with all the quality of life improvements, came some modern an-
noyances that people did not have to deal with a few decades ago. One of
those, that many people encounter regularly is remembering passwords. It is
both time consuming and productivity reducing hassle that can even present
a great security risk, due to the bypasses that people come up with. Hence
our long-term vision is providing a solution that not only replaces passwords,
but delivers a hassle-free, private and a safer experience for the user, while
also increasing the overall security of the underlying system.
In this thesis, our initial step towards that direction involves data collec-
tion, analysis, as well as modelling using traditional machine learning tools.
However we do not incorporate one of the hottest topics in machine learning
right now – neural networks. Therefore, a potential next step is to apply an
architecture that includes them and compare the results to the ones achieved
by ensemble algorithms. Considering the fact that the meta-data of our
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dataset includes the information about the user and the current performing
task, building an adversarial approach similar to [62, 63], which maximises
the user, and minimises the task accuracy is an approach we can try next.
Providing as much data as possible to a neural network is commonly
beneficial to the performance of it. Hence aggregating the data to a much
smaller time interval would provide a much larger dataset, though it is yet
to be seen if resampling the data would have a valuable contribution, as we
would likely only multiplicate the data rows already present in the dataset.
Another fashion to enlarge the amount of data is of course to perform more
experiments, favorable with new and different users to diversify the demo-
graphically monotonous dataset we gathered in this work, as presented in
Section 8.4, where we talk about the low number of users and more impor-
tantly the similarity of their professions. This presents a tougher conditions
for recognition, as it is harder to distinguish between two users that are, for
example, both well skilled in touch typing, than between one such user and
one that rarely uses a keyboard, but a more diverse dataset would better
present many working or home environments, as well as give us a better
insight of the operation of our system.
Regarding to performing more experiments, another idea to further progress
our work is to run physical simulations of attacks, proposed in this thesis.
To list a few examples: (a) an attacker observing a legitimate user and then
jumping in, trying to mimic that user and remaining authenticated for the
rest of the session; (b) an oblivious attacker waiting long enough for the
authenticated system to adapt to the idle state and then slowly starting to
interact with the environment in order to transit the model to its own be-
havioural patterns; (c) an attacker unplugging or removing certain sensors
in order to bypass the authentication mechanisms; (d) an attacker connect-
ing and using its own peripherals, connected to the system, again bypassing
authentication mechanisms; (e) multiple attackers present in a room at a
same time (not an attack as such, but would potentially provide interesting
insights in the system workings). Analyzing such attempts would reveal po-
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tential issues we still have to address to ensure the highest possible level of
security.
As it stands, our system is able of handling a single user in an envi-
ronment. For rigorous access control, where only a single person is granted
access at a time, that is sufficient, as we do not account for multi user pres-
ence in the environment. However these limitation do not translate well to
many modern working and home environments. For example, many offices
implement an open-plan design, meaning many people collaborating in the
same space, or even a simple family home – where the whole family gathers
every evening after a day of activities. Hence the expansion of the existing
system to incorporate multiple users is not only a potential feature we could




In this work we conducted a non-sensitive data collection study in an IoT
environment with up to twenty users. We assessed the potential of the
collected data for user authentication. Our findings highlight the infor-
mativeness of data sources placed “close” to the points of user interac-
tion. The random forest model we construct from the above sensor data
is able to detect the right user with 68% accuracy in Task 1 of the test
dataset consisting of previously unseen interaction sessions. Nevertheless,
the IoT sensor data-based approach exhibits its true potential when used
for continuous authentication. Our solution achieves 99.3% accuracy in con-
firming a pre-authenticated user’s identity, whereas a deception attack re-
mains detectable with more than 99% accuracy. Finally, to facilitate fur-
ther investigation of this topic, we publicly release all the collected data as
well as our analysis and machine learning programming code, accessible at
https://gitlab.fri.uni-lj.si/lrk/ca-iot.
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Appendix A
Text content used in task one
1. First run: John von Neumann was a Hungarian-American mathe-
matician, physicist, computer scientist and polymath. Von Neumann
was generally regarded as the foremost mathematician of his time and
said to be the last representative of the great mathematicians. A genius
who was comfortable integrating both pure and applied sciences.
He was a pioneer of the application of operator theory to quantum
mechanics in the development of functional analysis and a key figure in
the development of game theory and the concepts of cellular automata,
the universal constructor and the digital computer.
2. Second run: Alan Mathison Turing was an English mathematician,
computer scientist, logician, cryptanalyst, philosopher and theoretical
biologist. Turing was highly influential in the development of theo-
retical computer science, providing a formalisation of the concepts of
algorithm and computation with the Turing machine, which can be
considered a model of a general-purpose computer.
Turing is widely considered to be the father of theoretical computer
science and artificial intelligence. Despite these accomplishments, he
was not fully recognised in his home country during his lifetime, due to
his homosexuality, and because much of his work was covered by the
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Official Secrets Act.
Appendix B
Instructions in boxes in task
three
B.0.1 Box X
• Turn on the lights,
• find the box, marked with an ‘Y’,
• follow the instructions in the box.
B.0.2 Box Y
• In the room, there are 4 boxes marked with a ‘Z’,
• one of those boxes contains further instructions,
• find the instructions and follow them.
B.0.3 Box Z
• Take the card with the data,
• go to the PC and turn it on,
• ignore (do not close) the black window that appears on the screen,
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• create a graph with the data presented in the data card,
• send an email with a graph to the ——@——.—,
• return the data and instruction cards to any of the boxes, marked with
a ‘Z’,
• turn off the computer,
• turn the lights off,
• leave the room.
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[61] K. Čopič Pucihar, C. Sandor, M. Kljun, W. Huerst, A. Plopski, T. Take-
tomi, H. Kato, L. A. Leiva, The missing interface: micro-gestures on
augmented objects, in: Extended Abstracts of the 2019 CHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2019, pp. 1–6.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 85
[62] S. Liu, J. Du, A. Shrivastava, L. Zhong, Privacy adversarial network:
Representation learning for mobile data privacy, Proceedings of the
ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies
3 (4) (2019) 1–18.
[63] K. Grosse, N. Papernot, P. Manoharan, M. Backes, P. D. McDaniel, Ad-
versarial perturbations against deep neural networks for malware clas-
sification, CoRR abs/1606.04435 (2016). arXiv:1606.04435.
URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04435
